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The question of how lawmakers should respond to
developmental differences between adolescents and adults in
formulating juvenile crime policy has been the subject of debate
for a generation. A theme of the punitive law reforms that
dismantled the traditional juvenile justice system in the 1980s and
1990s was that adolescents were not different from adults in any
way that was relevant to criminal punishment-or at least that any
differences were trumped by the demands of public safety.' But
this view has been challenged in recent years; scholars and courts
have recognized that adolescents, due to their developmental
immaturity, are less culpable than adults and that the principle of
proportionality requires2 that teens be punished less severely for
their criminal offenses. Moreover, some scholars have invoked
developmental research to challenge the core assumption
underlying the punitive law reforms that harsh sanctions promote
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1. Matthew Thomas Wagman, Note, Innocence Lost: In the Wake of
Green, The Trend Is Clear-If You Are Old Enough to Do the Crime, You Are
Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 643 (2000).
2. See ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE
JUSTICE 118-48 (2008). The Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons announced
that to impose the death penalty on a juvenile was cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution; although the Court
offered several rationales for its conclusion, the heart of the opinion was a
proportionality analysis that emphasized the developmental immaturity of
adolescents. 543 U.S. 551, 568-76 (2005) (basing this analysis on Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death
Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (2003)). In 2010 the Court followed Roper
in holding that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicide
offense violates the Eighth Amendment. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011
(2010).
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public safety and reduce the social cost of j4Uvenile crime. 3 And
there is evidence that lawmakers are listening.
In this Article, we argue that a developmental model of
juvenile crime regulation grounded in scientific knowledge about
adolescence is both fairer to young offenders and more likely to
promote social welfare than a regime that fails to attend to
developmental research. We challenge the punitive reformers who
have presumed that public safety is enhanced and social welfare
promoted if serious juvenile offenders are punished as adults, and
who have been unconcerned about whether their approach is
compatible with principles of fair punishment. We focus here
primarily on the social welfare argument for a separate and more
lenient juvenile justice system grounded in a developmental
framework. First, the argument for mitigation on the grounds of
developmental immaturity is more familiar, and although it
supports less punishment, it provides no strong basis for a separate
justice system.s Moreover, lawmakers and the public care about
accountability, but they may care even more about public safety;
fears about the threat of young "superpredators" propelled the
transformation of uvenile crime policy that took place in the late
twentieth century. Thus, a regime that deals with juveniles more
leniently than adults (because they deserve less punishment) is
likely to fail in the political arena if public safety is imperiled. In
short, the viability of the developmental model depends on
evidence that the punitive response of the past generation is not
3. See Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 181-222. A few scholars have
gone a step further, arguing that public safety should be the only goal ofjuvenile
crime regulation. See Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile
Justice: The Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REv. 1 (2009).
4. In the past few years, policymakers have retreated somewhat from the
punitive reforms of the 1990s, often pointing to research on juveniles'
developmental immaturity. See, e.g., Editorial, Two Words: Wasteful and
ineffective, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2010, at A22 (describing New York's closure
of institutional juvenile justice facilities that contribute to reoffending, and
arguing for expedition of more closings).
5. Barry Feld has argued for a unitary justice system in which juveniles
receive a "youth discount" and receive shorter sentences. BARRY C. FELD, BAD
KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT (1999); see
also Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REv.
691 (1991).
6. This term was coined by University of Pennsylvania criminologist John
Dilulio, who in 1995 predicted that the new century would bring a juvenile
crime wave far worse than the 1990s. John J. Dilulio, Jr., The Coming of the
Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 23. Dilulio later
expressed regret for the hyperbole and acknowledged that the prediction had not
come to pass. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young "Superpredators,"
Bush Aide Has Regrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A19.
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only inconsistent with basic principles of fairness, but also that it
has failed to minimize the social cost of juvenile crime, and that
regulation based on social science research is more likely to attain
this goal.
The recent punitive reforms embodied a view that society's
interests are promoted by tough incarceration policies under which
more youths are dealt with in the adult system and offenders in the
juvenile system are incarcerated for longer periods of time.7 The
claim that these measures will reduce juvenile crime is critical to
the social welfare justification for more punitive sanctions, but it
turns out to be hard to evaluate. Juvenile crime indeed has declined
since its Veak in the early 1990s, but the causes of the decline are
complex. As we will see, studies that have examined the impact of
the adoption of punitive policies on youth crime rates yield mixed
results, offering little support for the claim that the declining crime
rates are largely due to the enactment of harsher laws.9
Evaluating the impact of the punitive reforms also requires
consideration of factors other than crime rates. First, the economic
costs of tough laws are substantial, as legislatures and government
agencies are beginning to recognize. Resources spent on building
and staffing correctional facilities needed to incarcerate more
juveniles for longer periods are not available for other social uses.
Even assuming that tough sanctions can reduce juvenile crime, at
some point the additional dollars expended may not offer enough
7. The views of Alfred Regnery, head of the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention under President Reagan, are typical of critics of the
traditional juvenile court who endorsed tough sanctions for young offenders.
"[T]here is no reason that society should be more lenient with a 16-year-old
offender than with a 30-year-old offender." Alfred S. Regnery, Getting Away
with Murder: Why the Juvenile Justice System Needs an Overhaul, 34 POL'Y
REv. 65, 68 (1985).
8. See infra Part II.B. For example, many states enacted punitive reforms
after crime rates began to fall, suggesting that other factors have played a role. The
adoption of Proposition 21 in California is a good example. In 2000, when the
referendum making transfer easier passed, juvenile crime rates had been declining
for five or six years. See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 102-17.
9. See infra Part II.C-D.
10. This has become a key issue in adult sentencing as well. See Rachel E.
Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 1276
(2005). Barkow argues that cost considerations can function as an important
constraint on punitive sentencing policies and points to state legislatures that
have retreated from harsh sentencing reforms in the face of rising costs. She
points out that in the 1990s, state governments doubled the amount spent on
corrections due to get-tough policies. Id. at 1287. For a discussion of the rising
costs ofjuvenile crime, see infra Part I.B.
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benefit to be justified." Also, if less costly correctional
dispositions are effective at reducing recidivism in some young
offenders, then incarcerating those youths may not be justified on
utilitarian grounds. Finally, included in the calculus are the
intangible and sometimes iatrogenic effects of correctional
programs on the future welfare of young offenders. Correctional
policies and programs that either reduce or enhance the prospect
that young offenders will lead satisfying lives affect social welfare.
In this Article, we examine empirical evidence that can inform
our thinking about optimal justice policies and how various
approaches will likely affect social welfare. This evidence is
varied; it includes studies of the economic costs of various
sanctions, the deterrent impact of statutory changes, recidivism
rates of different groups of offenders, and the effectiveness of
different kinds of programs. No single body of research provides a
clear answer to our normative question, but the complex empirical
account that emerges indicates that the use of adult sanctions
usually does not promote social welfare and that differential
treatment of juvenile offenders is justified on consequentialist as
well as retributive grounds. In our view, the research supports the
conclusion that adult punishment and longer incarceration in the
juvenile system have contributed somewhat to a reduction in
juvenile crime, largely through incapacitation. But the costs have
been high, and the societal benefits likely are limited to a far
smaller group of young offenders than are subject to harsh
penalties under current law. 12 Moreover, extensive research
indicates that less costly sanctions in the juvenile system, including
11. Economists find that increasing incarceration rates has diminishing
marginal returns. Some amount of incarceration yields substantial benefits in
terms of decreased crime, but those benefits decrease (i.e., fewer crimes are
avoided) for each unit of increased incarceration. See Steve Aos, The Criminal
Justice System in Washington State: Incarceration Rates, Taxpayer Costs,
Crime Rates and Prison Economics, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y (Jan.
2003), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/SentReport2002.pdf.
12. Social welfare may well be promoted by imposing tough sanctions on
youths who are chronic serious offenders. These youths are classified by Terrie
Moffitt as "life-course-persistent" offenders. Terrie Moffitt, Adolescence-
Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental
Taxonomy, 100 PSYCHOL. REV. 674 (1993). Many criminologists have found that
a small percentage of juvenile offenders commit a high percentage of juvenile
crimes. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, ROBERT M. FIGLIO & THORSTEN SELLIN,
DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 88 (1972); see also DAVID P. FARRINGTON,
LLOYD E. OHLIN & JAMES Q. WILSON, UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING
CRIME: TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH STRATEGY 50 (1986) (approximately 5%
commit 50% of crimes).
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community-based programs, may be effective at reducing
recidivism.13
Our social welfare analysis is informed by scientific knowledge
of adolescence and youth crime, which reinforces the conclusion
that policies based on broad use of incarceration are unlikely to
minimize the social cost of juvenile crime. An important lesson of
the developmental research is that most young law-breakers are
normative adolescent offenders whose criminal activities are
linked to developmental forces and who can be expected to
"mature out" of their antisocial tendencies.14 Therefore, there is no
reason to assume that these youths are headed for careers in crime
unless correctional interventions push them in that direction. The
research also shows that social context is critically important to the
successful completion of developmental tasks that are essential to
the transition to conventional adult roles associated with desistance
from crime. For young offenders, correctional programs shape that
social context and can enhance or inhibit this process. Today,
many teens without prior records are swept into the adult criminal
justice system, by any account a harsh developmental environment.
Even in the juvenile systems in many states, young offenders are
incarcerated for long periods in prison-like facilities.' 5
Developmental research supports other evidence indicating that
enthusiasm for imposing harsh sanctions on young offenders is
misguided and that policies grounded in scientific knowledge are
far more likely to reduce the social cost of juvenile crime.
This research not only informs policies that promote social
welfare; it also provides the foundation for a regime committed to
fair and proportionate punishment of young offenders. Recently,
some scholars have advocated an approach to juvenile justice
dedicated solely to crime reduction,1 but we are persuaded that
both social welfare and fairness are essential components of a
viable and stable regime. Although society's primary goal in
responding to juvenile crime may well be preventive in nature, the
principle of retribution is a necessary check on government power
in this context. The retributive principle of proportionality
functions importantly as a side constraint, limiting the duration of
correctional interventions to what is deserved on the basis of the
13. See infra Part III.E.
14. Moffitt calls this group "adolescence-limited" offenders. See supra note
12; see also infra note 178.
15. TASK FORCE ON TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE, CHARTING A NEW
COURSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR TRANSFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK
STATE (2009), available at http://www.vera.org/paterson-task-force-juvenile-
justic-report (criticizing the incarceration ofjuveniles in youth prisons).
16. See Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 3.
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seriousness of the offense and the offender's culpability. In
contrast, under a pure prevention approach, the government is free
to intervene in the lives of individual offenders to the extent
deemed necessary to prevent crime.17 The potential for unfairness
under that approach is substantial-both in the form of excessive
punishment and in the likelihood of variations in responses to
offenders based on considerations related to risk but not linked to
the crime itself.1 8 This possible unfairness may undermine the
legitimacy of the justice system, and it can be avoided by
incorporating proportionality as well as prevention into the
developmental framework.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the increased
use of incarceration in both the adult and juvenile systems under
the law reforms of the last generation and examines the resulting
impact on state budgets. This raises the question of whether the
substantial cost increases are justified by a reduction in juvenile
crime. Part II examines the theoretical basis for assuming that the
reforms should result in lower crime rates and then offers the
available empirical evidence on this issue. This evidence includes
studies of the impact of legislative change as well as comparative
studies of recidivism in the adult and juvenile systems; in
combination, the research provides little support for the
assumption that the punitive reforms have reduced crime beyond
reductions attributable to incapacitation. Part III introduces
scientific research on adolescence that underscores the important
impact of correctional interventions and settings on developmental
trajectories and on reoffending. This developmental research
reinforces the conclusion that for most juveniles, long
incarceration increases the social cost of crime and should be used
only when public safety is at stake. The research also clarifies that
some community programs can lower these costs. Part IV turns to
retribution and proportionality and, applying developmental
research, concludes that mitigation should be applied to the crimes
of juveniles. We argue that retribution must be incorporated as a
limiting principle in any legitimate and stable system of juvenile
crime regulation.
17. The boundary for intervention under Slobogin and Fondacaro's
argument is the maximum age of juvenile court jurisdiction. They reject transfer
to adult court. Id. at 15-16.
18. For example, longer dispositions may be imposed on offenders who lack
parental support, which may be relevant to treatment response.
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I. YouTHs BEHIND BARS: THE EXPANDING NET AND ITS FINANCIAL
CosT
We begin by taking a closer look at the implementation of the
punitive law reforms in juvenile justice and its financial impact on
state budgets, the most concrete costs of the legal changes. How
have the new laws changed the way juveniles are actually being
processed and punished? As a result of the reforms, a large number
of youths who previously would have been under exclusive
juvenile court jurisdiction are potentially subject to processing and
punishment as adults. This does not mean, however, that all or
even most youths who could be subject to criminal prosecution
today are actually tried and punished as adults. Indeed, the impact
of statutes expanding the discretionary authority of judges to
transfer youths has been modest. 19 But the widespread enactment
of legislative waiver statutes that categorically redefine juveniles
as adults has resulted in adult prosecution and punishment of many
youths who previously would have been kept in the juvenile
system. This change, together with longer sentences in the juvenile
system, has greatly increased the number of incarcerated youths in
this country. This in turn has resulted in legislatures devoting a
greater portion of their budgets to juvenile corrections. than was
true a generation ago.
A. The Trend Toward Incarceration
In some states, the tough reforms seem to have had little effect
on the adjudication and disposition of young criminals. For
example, emerging evidence suggests that California's Proposition
21, which greatly expanded the categories of youths susceptible to
criminal court adjudication, has had a more modest impact on
prosecutorial and judicial practices than was predicted by either
supporters or opponents. 20 In other states, however, the impact of
tougher laws has been substantial. During the 1980s and 1990s,
many states categorically lowered the age of criminal court
jurisdiction for a broad range of serious crimes, and a few states
lowered the general jurisdictional age from 18 to either 17 or 16. In
19. See infra Part I.A.
20. For a discussion of Proposition 21, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note
2, at 102-17; see also Anna Gorman, Few D.A.s Use New Power to Try
Juveniles as Adults, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2004, at B 1.
2010] 41
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this way, groups of juveniles have been reclassified categorically
as adults for purposes of criminal prosecution.21
More information is available about youths who are tried as
adults as a result of discretionary judicial transfer than those who
are subject to criminal prosecution under legislative waiver or
automatic transfer statutes. The number of youths transferred by
judges fell from a high of about 13,000 in 1994 to about 7,000 in
2002.22 The percentage of transfer cases that involved violent
offenses afainst persons was slightly higher than property and drug
offenses.2 A large proportion of transferred teens are 16 or 17
years old; judges are less likely to transfer youths aged 15 or
younger, although the number of youths under age 15 who were
transferred doubled between 1985 and 2002.24 African American
juveniles are far more likely to be transferred than their white
counterparts. Statistics from the 1990s indicated that more than
60% of transferred youths were convicted of their offenses and, of
those convicted, about 70% were incarcerated in prison or jail.25
A far larger number of youths under the age of 18 are subject
to criminal prosecution under legislative waiver statutes than are
subject to judicial transfer, but we lack good statistics on how
many youths are subject to adult punishment under these statutes.26
Thirty-eight states mandate adult criminal prosecution for some
21. Wisconsin, New Hampshire, and Wyoming have lowered the general
jurisdictional age in the past generation. Altogether, 14 states set the upper
boundary of the juvenile court jurisdictional age below age 18. HOwARD N.
SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT'L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE
OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT (2006), available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. As of 2004, 29
states categorically exclude certain juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction.
These include states that set the jurisdictional age below eighteen, generally or
for felonies, as well as states that mandate that youths charged with specific
serious crimes be tried as adults. Fifteen states make judicial waiver mandatory
for certain offenses, if certain criteria are met. See State Juvenile Justice
Profiles: National Overviews, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUV. JUST., http://
70.89,227.250:8080/stateprofiles/overviews/transferstate overview.asp (last
visited Sept. 14, 2010). Rhode Island lowered the jurisdictional age from 18 to
16 and then raised it again six months later. See Ray Henry, Rhode Island
Lawmakers Repeal Law Imprisoning Teens, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 31, 2007).
22. See SNYDER& SICKMUND, supra note 21, at 186.
23. Id. Transfer for drug offenses has increased substantially since the mid-
1980s.
24. Id Twenty-three states have no minimum age for transfer to criminal court;
the rest have minimum ages ranging from 10 to 15 years of age. Id. at 114.
25. See State Juvenile Justice Profiles, NAT'L CENTER FOR JUV. JUSTICE,
http://70.89.227.250:8080/stateprofiles/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
26. The absence of age data on youths categorically classified as adults is
due to the fact that information about age is usually not included in statistics
about criminal charges, convictions, and sentences of adults.
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categories of young defendants under the age of 18 (based on the
offense charged), and about a dozen set the age of general
jurisdiction for adult criminal prosecution at age 16 or 17 when
youths are legal minors for most other purposes.27 According to
recent estimates, about 220,000 teens, mostly 16 and 17 year olds,
are automatically subject to criminal prosecution and punishment
annually under legislative jurisdictional and waiver statutes. 28
Youths who are convicted in criminal court are more likely to
be incarcerated for their offenses and, according to recent studies,
are confined for substantially longer periods on average than those
who are sentenced in juvenile court. 29 The Washington State
Institute for Public Policy produces much of the best empirical data
on these issues (and generally on the impact of juvenile justice
policies and practices).30 In one study, Institute researchers
compared average minimum sentence lengths before and after the
1994 enactment of a statute automatically transferring to adult
court 16- and 17-year-old youths charged with certain violent
crimes that previously had been subject to discretionary judicial
27. See State Juvenile Justice Profiles: National Overviews, supra note 21.
In New York, for example, general juvenile court jurisdiction ends at age
sixteen, and jurisdiction for murder ends at age 13. Id. (under "State Profiles,"
select "New York").
28. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, THE CONSEQUENCES AREN'T MINOR:
THE IMPACT OF TRYING YOUTH AS ADULTS AND STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
(2007), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/
CFYJNR ConsequencesMinor.pdf.
29. The Washington Institute of Public Policy has found that youths tried as
adults receive substantially longer sentences. See Robert Barnoski, Changes in
Washington State's Jurisdiction of Juvenile Offenders: Examining the Impact,
WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y 16-20 (Jan. 2003), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/
rptfiles/JuvJurisChange.pdf. Barnoski found that under Washington's
discretionary transfer law, youths who were transferred received an average
sentence of almost six years as compared to those retained in juvenile court who
received less than a year. The combined average was 1.78 years. After the
enactment of the state's automatic transfer law (under which all youths were
tried as adults), the average was 2.8 years. Id.; see also Jeffrey Fagan, The
Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on
Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y 77 (1996). In
a comparative study, Fagan found that 46% of youths convicted of robbery were
sentenced to prison or jail for first offenses in New York, while in New Jersey,
18% of those processed as juveniles were incarcerated. For a discussion of
Fagan's study, see infra Part II.D.
30. This research institute was created by the state legislature to study the
cost effectiveness of justice system (and other social) legislation and policies,
primarily in Washington, but nationally as well. The institute conducts
sophisticated and comprehensive research that is an important source of
information in evaluating the costs and benefits of legal regulation. WASH. ST.
INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, http://www.wsipp.wa.gov (last updated Sept. 1, 2010).
432010]
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transfer. 3 1 The researchers found sentences to be 50% longer for
crimes that met the automatic transfer criteria than under the
judicial waiver regime, when fewer than 25% of youths charged
with these crimes were tried as adults. 32 Fifteen percent of youths
automatically transferred to adult court received sentences of five
years or more, whereas no youths retained in juvenile court before
1994 received such lengthy sentences.3 3 Because jurisdiction in the
juvenile correctional system in most states ends by age 21 or
earlier, some youths who are prosecuted as adults receive
sentences many times as long as the maximum period of
confinement in a juvenile facility.
That is not to say that young offenders today are subject to
lenient treatment in the juvenile system; delinquency dispositions
have also become harsher under the recent policy reforms. Youths
are more likely to be confined in secure juvenile facilities for
longer periods than a generation ago. According to another
Washington study, confinement rates in that state's juvenile system
increased by 40% in the 1990s, a period when serious crime rates
fell by 50%.34 In the late 1980s, 2.5 out of 1,000 Washington
youths were confined in juvenile facilities; a decade later the
confinement rate increased to 3.5 youths per 1,000.35
In sum, the best available evidence indicates that the punitive
reforms have resulted in substantial increases in the incarceration
of juveniles, both in the adult criminal justice system and in the
juvenile system. In an era in which juvenile crime rates have
declined, more young lawbreakers are subject to incarceration and
for longer periods, due primarily to the combination of legislative
waiver laws and tougher sanctions in the juvenile system.
B. The Economic Costs of the Punitive Reforms
The debate about the merits of the punitive reforms has focused
primarily on whether the increased use of incarceration has
31. Bamoski, supra note 29, at 17-19.
32. Id. The study examined cases over a two and one half year period before
the enactment of the statute (January 1, 1992 to July 1, 1994) and a similar
period after enactment (January 1, 1998 to July 1, 2001). In the "before" group,
738 youths were retained in juvenile court and 175 transferred. In the "after"
group, 690 youths were tried as adults. Id. at 4.
33. Id. at 19. Under discretionary transfer, 35% of transferred youths
received a sentence of five years or more, but less than 25% of youths were
transferred.
34. Steven Aos, The Juvenile Justice System in Washington State:
Recommendations to Improve Cost-Effectiveness, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB.
POL'Y, 2 (Oct. 2002), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/WhatWorksJuv.pdf.
35. Id.
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reduced juvenile crime and, to a lesser extent, on their impact on
young offenders. Interestingly, until recently, the economic costs
associated with the increased use of incarceration of juveniles
received relatively little attention in the policy debates.36 Economic
expenditures are the most concrete costs of the policies we are
examining, and evaluating the benefit of any crime reduction
impact requires that we know the financial cost incurred. The
headline is that the impact on state budgets of the recent justice
reforms has been substantial. Moreover, although juvenile crime
has declined significantly since the early 1990s, the costs of
responding to youthful criminal activity have risen substantially.
According to a careful analysis of the costs and benefits associated
with one state's policies responding to juvenile crime, serious
juvenile crime declined by 50% between 1994 and 2001, while
expenditures in the juvenile justice system increased by 43%.37
Not surprisingly, this increase in spending is due largely to the
expanded use of incarceration as the preferred (or required)
sanction for young offenders. Longer sentences in both the juvenile
and criminal systems, and the use of incarceration in place of
community sanctions, add up to higher justice system costs. The
cost of incarcerating a youth for a year in the juvenile system
varies in different states, depending on labor costs and the quality
and kinds of programs provided. Costs range from $215,000 in
New York youth prisons, $100,000 in California, almost $90 000
in Virginia, $58,000 in Florida, and $45,000 in Washington.J A
year of imprisonment in the adult system is less expensive than a
year of incarceration in the juvenile system, in part because prisons
36. In the past few years, legislatures have begun to examine the budgetary
burden of harsh sanctions. This issue has become quite prominent in
deliberations about adult sentencing policy as legislatures across the country
have revised and moderated harsh sentencing regimes in response to evidence
that criminal justice system costs had doubled in the 1990s. See Barkow, supra
note 10; see also Daniel F. Wilhelm & Nicholas R. Turner, Is the Budget Crisis
Changing the Way We Look at Sentencing and Incarceration?, ISSUES BRIEF
(Vera Inst. of Justice, New York, N.Y.), June 2002.
37. See Aos, supra note 34.
38. In Virginia, a 2009 report by the Department of Juvenile Justice
reported that the per capita cost of holding one juvenile for a year was $120,167.
VA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, DATA RESOURCE GUIDE: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at
192 (2009), available at http://www.djj.virginia.gov/AboutUs/Administrative
Units/Researchand EvaluationUnit/pdflAppendices_2009.pdf; see also Barnoski,
supra note 29, at 19 (describing yearly per youth cost of a juvenile facility as
almost $45,000). Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently announced that New York
City would greatly reduce the number of youths incarcerated in youth prisons,
citing a cost of $215,000 per year per youth. Julie Bosman, City Signals Intent to
Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A31, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html.
2010] 45
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
are less likely to provide educational and counseling services and
have a higher ratio of inmates to staff. Cost estimates per prisoner
range from $25,000 to $40,000 per year.39 But, as we have
suggested, criminal sentences generally are longer than juvenile
dispositions and therefore are often costlier.4 0
The recent reforms have also generated increased procedural
costs. In the juvenile system, many cases that would have been
dealt with informally 20 years ago are subject to formal
adjudication today.4 1 Increased costs are also associated with
prosecution and adjudication in criminal court. The procedural
protections afforded defendants and the time expended by judges,
attorneys, jurors, and law enforcement agents combine to make
criminal trials very expensive. Even when convictions are based on
plea agreements, the costs are far greater than are those of
delinquency proceedings, which, even in the post-Gault era, tend
to be more informal, briefer, and simpler.
State governments today spend more money prosecuting and
punishing juveniles than they did in the early 1990s, when juvenile
crime rates were far higher. These expenditures are funded either
by higher taxes or by shifting funds from other programs.
Governors and legislatures are usually reluctant to raise taxes, and
thus they may cut allocations for public schools or social programs
so that adequate funds are available for incarcerating juveniles. 42
Are these expenditures justified? From the perspective of social
welfare, the answer depends on whether two conditions are met-
first, that the economic costs of incarceration policies (together
with other indirect costs that we will explore shortly) are offset by
greater public benefits in terms of reduced crime, and second, that
these policies are more effective at accomplishing their purposes
39. Costs in Washington were estimated at about $36,000. See Barnoski,
supra note 29, at 19. Prisons have lower costs per prisoner than juvenile
facilities for several reasons. First, prisons are larger than juvenile facilities and
thus can reduce costs from economies of scale. The ratio of staff to inmates is
usually much lower in juvenile facilities, in part because inmates are not
confined as restrictively. Moreover, juvenile facilities generally have more
counselors and teachers and generally offer more programming to inmates.
40. In Washington, the average cost of confinement per youth increased
from $65,000 under the discretionary transfer regime to $75,000 under the
automatic transfer law. Id. at 20.
41. See SNYDER& SICKMUND, supra note 21.
42. George Allen, Governor of Virginia during the 1990s, cut state health
and education funding while substantially increasing the budget of the
Department of Corrections. See Virginia Legislature Rejects Tax Cut Proposal,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1995, at A21. Several prison construction projects were
undertaken during Allen's administration.
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than other, less costly, policies.43 In the pages that follow we
explore these conditions and conclude that the evidence does not
justify the incarceration policies adopted in the recent period of
punitive reform.
II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNITIVE POLICIES: Do HARSH
SANCTIONS REDUCE CRIME?
We turn now to the question of whether youth crime policies
based on expansive use of incarceration are effective in
accomplishing the goal of reducing youth crime. If so, several
kinds of benefits follow that may justify the increase in
government spending. In cost-benefit evaluations of crime policies,
economists include the benefit to potential victims of crimes that
are not committed: Less crime will reduce costs that can include
(depending on the crime) lost possessions, physical pain and
psychological distress, lost productivity, medical expenses, and
lost lives. Less crime also enhances the well-being of citizens
generally. The residential real estate market illustrates the fact that
people attach a monetary value to feeling safe as they go about
their lives-comparable housing is cheaper in high-crime
neighborhoods than in those where crime rates are low. Desistance
from a life of crime (or avoidance of criminal activity altogether)
also offers intangible value to youths in terms of their future well-
being and productivity. Youths who are deterred from involvement
in crime (or from reoffending) are likely to experience benefits
from lives that are more likely than those of young criminals to
include educational achievement, stable employment, and
rewarding intimate relationships." Finally, state expenditures on
the operation of the justice system should decline if crime is
reduced, including not only the costs of operating correctional
facilities and programs, but also the costs of law enforcement and
criminal proceedings.
43. According to some estimates, one year of incarceration in the juvenile
system costs between five and ten times as much (depending on incarceration
costs) as a year of community-based services that, as we will see, have been
found to be very effective in reducing future offending. See infra Part III.E.
44. Youths who persist in criminal activity tend to have poor educational
outcomes, unstable relationships in adulthood, and poor employment records;
they also tend to be poor parents to their own children, who are more likely to
get involved in criminal activity than other children. See Terrie E. Moffitt,
Avshalom Caspi & Michael Rutter, Measured Gene-Environment Interactions
in Psychopathology: Concepts, Research Strategies, and Implications for
Research, Intervention, and Public Understanding of Genetics, 1 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 5 (2006).
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Thus a critical question is whether harsh sanctions, which
represent a substantial financial investment, are an effective means
of reducing crime, as proponents argue. To answer that question,
we first describe the political background of the period of punitive
reforms and briefly explain why proponents thought tough policies
would effectively reduce crime. We then look at the empirical
evidence on whether the claims have merit. This evidence is varied
and includes studies of the effect of legal change on crime rates
and studies of the impact of different correctional settings on
reoffending.
A. The Traditional Regime and the Failure to Prevent Crime
To the punitive reformers of the late 1980s and 1990s, violent
juvenile crime was a critical threat to social welfare, one that was
caused largely by the lax response to crime of traditional juvenile
courts.4 5 On the view of critics, the juvenile court was a "revolving
door"; the typical young offender received a slap on the wrist from
the judge and was soon out on the street again engaging in criminal
activity-until he got caught and returned to court. Youths were
virtually invited to engage in criminal activities by a regime that
used community probation as the standard sanction. A delinquency
charge carried no deterrent threat because youths knew that no
serious consequences would follow the adjudication.46
The perception that juvenile court judges were unduly lenient
was due as much to the naive rhetoric that surrounded the
traditional regime as to the reality of the juvenile justice system. In
fact, many youths who committed serious crimes were confined in
secure correctional facilities. However, there was some merit to the
critics' challenge that the system failed to deter youths from
engaging in criminal activity. Much anecdotal evidence indicates
that young criminals of a generation ago assumed that they were
insulated from punishment by virtue of their status as juveniles,
and this may have encouraged some to engage (or persist) in
delinquent activities. Police officers reported that they were
taunted during arrests by youths calling, "I'm a juvie," as though
45. See ScoTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 94-96.
46. Politicians have often justified tougher laws on the grounds that the
juvenile system presented no threat to young criminals. Missouri Governor Mel
Carnahan praised a new law removing the minimum age for adult prosecution of
young drug dealers, suggesting that youths were lured into the drug trade
because they saw no possible risks: "Now these teenagers will know there is a
risk, and it is real time in a real prison." Mark Schlinkmann & Kim Bell,
Carnahan Signs Juvenile Crime Bill: Allows Trial as Adults in Serious Cases,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 3, 1995, at Bl.
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this meant they had a free pass to engage in criminal activity.
According to conventional wisdom, "adult" members of criminal
gangs frequently assigned tasks that might result in arrest to
juveniles. Even Chris Simmons, whose death sentence the
Supreme Court overturned in 2005, was reported to believe that as
a juvenile he would be treated leniently.47 Thus, it is hard to deny
that the traditional juvenile system not only failed in its
rehabilitative mission but also was unsuccessful in deterring crime
and incapacitating young offenders.
There was another dimension to the claim that legal reforms
were necessary to protect the public from young criminals. In the
1990s, some observers predicted that, unless tough policies were
enacted, the country would face an even larger wave of violent
youth crime in the first decade of the twenty-first century as a large
cohort of children born in the early 1990s became teenagers.
Several criminologists promoted this view, including John Dilulio,
who warned politicians and the public of a coming generation of
"superpredators," youths without moral sensibilities who would
roam the streets in gangs, terrorizing the public with their violent
and senseless rampages. 48 Thus, the policy goal of crime
prevention took on an unprecedented urgency in the face of this
overwhelming threat, and politicians embraced tough incarceration
policies as the means of protecting the public.
How did the punitive reformers think harsh sanctions would
reduce crime? As first year law students learn in their Criminal
Law classes, several preventive rationales justify criminal
punishment and may be offered in support of harsh juvenile crime
policies. 49 First, the threat of punishment can generally deter future
47. For an insightful analysis of Roper, see Elizabeth F. Emens,
Aggravating Youth: Roper v. Simmons and Age Discrimination, 2005 SUP. CT.
REv. 51.
48. Dilulio, supra note 6. Dilulio describes superpredators as youths who
grow up in extreme "moral poverty," without the care and love of responsible
parents who teach their children right from wrong. This leads them to be
radically present-oriented, such that they perceive no connection between crime
and later punishment, and radically self-regarding, with no feeling for their
victims. He predicted tens of thousands of young superpredators would roam the
streets in the next decade, committing heinous violent acts for trivial reasons:
"They live by the meanest code of the meanest streets, a code that reinforces
rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger mentality." Id. Although Dilulio's
prescription for dealing with the crisis was to bring religion into these youths'
lives, others who adopted the image and repeated the frightening predictions
argued for harsh justice policies. See FRANKLIN ZIMRING, AMERICAN YOUTH
VIOLENCE 4-5 (1998) (statement by Bill McCollum before the House
Committee on Early Childhood, Youth, and Families in 1996).
49. See RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 14-33 (2d ed. 2004).
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crime by discouraging youths from ever getting involved in
50* *criminal activity. Policies that emphasize incarceration may also
serve a specific deterrent function, influencing youths who fear
future punishment not to reoffend after they are released. Here the
idea is that the experience of being in prison is sufficiently
unpleasant that young offenders will be motivated to stay out of
trouble in the future. Moreover, imprisonment prevents crime by
incapacitating offenders; young criminals who are locked up
cannot be out on the streets committing crimes. Finally, in theory
at least, imprisonment could reduce future crime by rehabilitating
young offenders so that they will mend their criminal ways,
although proponents of tough policies have not emphasized
rehabilitation.
Preventive rationales for criminal punishment need not be
excessively punitive, of course. Modem theorists who accept that
deterrence is the primary justification for punishing criminals may
disagree about what level of punishment is appropriate. As we
discuss in Part IV, some legal theorists support that prevention of
crime is a legitimate justification for criminal punishment but
argue that the appropriate amount of punishment is limited by the
retributive principle of proportionality. 52 But politicians in the
1980s and 1990s often seemed unconcerned with fairness
constraints, arguing that harsh punishment of juveniles was
necessary to contain the epidemic of youth crime.
50. Jeremy Bentham famously described general deterrence as the primary
goal of criminal punishment. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF
PUNISHMENT (1830). According to Bentham, "The punishment suffered by the
offender presents to every one an example of what he himself will have to suffer
if he is guilty of the same offence." Id. at 20. Critics of traditional policies
argued that the leniency of juvenile courts failed to deter youths from
involvement in crime.
51. Supporters of recent reforms generally do not emphasize rehabilitation,
perhaps viewing it as tainted by association with the traditional juvenile system,
which was premised on a goal of rehabilitation.
52. NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 199 (1982)
(noting that retribution is not a defining principle but a limiting principle of
criminal punishment); HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 66 (1968). Thus, although sentencing shoplifters to life in prison
might effectively deter this crime, this punishment would be unfair on
proportionality grounds. Similarly, a prediction that an individual will commit a
crime, however accurate, is insufficient, in the absence of conduct, as a basis of
criminal punishment. H.L.A. Hart argued that retributive principles are
important in a consequentialist system because they will contribute to
widespread public acceptance. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
180 (1968). We discuss this issue further in Part IV, infra.
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B. Changing Crime Rates and the Effectiveness of Punitive Policies
Supporters of the recent reforms may point to the fact that
juvenile crime has declined substantially since the early 1990s as
evidence that they have succeeded in achieving their crime-
reduction goal. On this account, youths who might be inclined to
engage in criminal activity are deterred because they now realize
that real consequences will follow. Bad kids who did not get the
message are locked up (and will learn from the experience to stay
out of trouble in the future). So, to what extent does the decline in
criminal activity indicate that the reform policies are working?
Although crime rates should fall if tough sanctions in fact deter
crime, criminologists who study both adult and juvenile crime
emphasize that we cannot assume that changes in crime rates are
caused by changes in penal policy affecting the harshness of
punishment. Historical reviews indicate that crime rates fluctuate
over time and that many factors contribute to the variations.
Criminologists agree that crime rates fell (from extraordinarily
high rates) for much of the nineteenth century and began to rise
again in the mid-twentieth century. There is no agreement,
however, about what explains this trend. Demographics may be
an important factor; some experts have suggested that crime rates
are correlated with the percentage of teens and young men in the
population at a given time.54 Others point to cultural and religious
influences. James Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, for example,
have argued that declining crime rates in the nineteenth century
were a product of a period of religious revivalism and moral
awakening that affected the socialization of children in families,
schools, and communities. 5 Some criminologists attribute the
sharp rise in juvenile homicide in the late 1980s to the easy
availability of cheap guns.5 Why were teens able to get firearms
53. Michael Tonry & Joan Petersilia, American Prisons at the Beginning of
the Twenty-First Century, in 26 CRIME AND JUSTICE 3 (Michael Tonry & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1999).
54. James Alan Fox & Alex R. Piquero, Deadly Demographics: Population
Characteristics and Forecasting Homicide Trends, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 339
(2003).
55. See JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN
NATURE (1985). The argument that today's young criminals are "superpredators,"
in part, is the mirror image of this argument. According to adherents, these
youths lack any sense of moral responsibility because none was instilled by their
parents. See supra note 48.
56. See ZIMRING, supra note 48. According to FBI statistics, homicides by
juveniles involving guns increased dramatically in the late 1980s and early
1990s, but other homicides did not-the rate of homicides not involving guns
continued at a steady, relatively low rate. Unform Crime Reporting Program
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so easily? The explanation may lie partly in developments in
technology and marketing, and partly in the successful lobbying
efforts of the National Rifle Association.
Crime rates are statistically complex, and during any period,
many factors can influence individual decisions about getting
involved in criminal activity that in the aggregate constitute crime
rates. Changes in justice policies might be important, but assertions
that declining juvenile crime rates demonstrate that punitive
policies have been effective are na'ive, particularly in light of the
fact that crime rates began to decline in many states before legal
reforms were enacted.
C. Does Deterrence Work? On Legal Reform and Crime Rates
Although broad claims about the causes of fluctuations in
crime rates are speculative, social scientists have produced a large
body of research (mostly focusing on adults) that probes the
deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. Perceptual deterrence
studies (based on self-reports) provide the most direct evidence of
the impact of anticipated punishment on individuals' decisions not
to engage in criminal activity, but their reliability is uncertain, and
their findings are mixed. Moreover, the extent to which even
sincere expressed intentions predict behavior is unclear." Other
researchers have focused on more indirect evidence, seeking to
link changes in crime rates to particular statutory enactments or
changes in law enforcement practices, while controlling 9 to the
extent possible, for other factors that influence crime rates.39 These
Resource Guide, NAT'L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA, http://www.icpsr.umich
.edulNACJD/ucr.html (click on "Supplementary Homicide Reports" for each of
the years 1976-1992) (last visited Sept. 18, 2010).
57. California's Proposition 21 was adopted after five years of falling crime
rates. See Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 105.
58. Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the
Twenty-First Century, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE 1, 12-23 (Michael Tonry ed.,
1998); Raymond Paternoster & Alex R. Piquero, Reconceptualizing Deterrence:
An Empirical Test of Personal and Vicarious Experiences, 32 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 251 (1995). Perceptual deterrence studies are useful as a means to
understand how perceptions about the risk and severity of criminal punishment
affect expressed intentions about offending. The limitation of this type of
research is that the relationship between responses to questions in a study and
criminal behavior is uncertain, either because study subjects are not candid or
because the actual choice about criminal activity is driven by other factors.
59. For example, in the 1990s, researchers studied patterns of criminal
activity responding to recently enacted "three strikes" laws, which mandate a
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studies either examine crime rates immediately before and after a
policy reform or compare crime rates in states that have adopted
enhanced penalties with others that have not.
Experts on deterrence agree that simply having a system of law
enforcement and criminal punishment has a general deterrent effect
on crime-there would be a lot more crime if there were no
criminal justice system.60 However, as Daniel Nagin, a leading
expert on deterrence research, has emphasized, getting useful
information about the marginal deterrent impact of particular
policy changes is an uncertain business. 6 1 Studies of the
effectiveness of specific policies on criminal behavior have mixed
findings. For example, various studies of three-strike laws have
found a crime-reduction effect in some states but not in others, and
some studies have found that criminal activity actually increased
following the enactment of the enhanced penalties. 62 Some studies
find an initial deterrent effect of new policies (such as drunk
driving laws) that erodes over time.63
One explanation for the varied and inconsistent research
findings is that many factors contribute to effective deterrence
besides the severity of sanctions. Certainty of apprehension and
punishment appears to be far more important to deterrence than
severity of sanction; potential offenders who fear they will get
caught are more likely to be deterred than those who think they
will not.64 If law enforcement is ineffective, or if harsh sentences
under the new laws are infrequently imposed or unpredictable,
potential offenders may view the risk of arrest and punishment as
low, and enhanced penalties will have little deterrent impact. Of
course, would-be criminals must also be aware of the increased
sanctions in some general way for deterrence to work. Further, the
punishment must represent a substantial threat to the individual, in
terms of both loss of liberty and social stigma. If many associates
life sentence on conviction of a third felony. Several types of deterrence
research are described by Nagin. See Nagin, supra note 58, at 2.
60. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS,
37-44 (1976); Nagin, supra note 58.
61. Nagin, supra note 58, at 4-8 (describing impediments to evaluating
effectiveness of policies).
62. Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and
Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143 (2003).
63. H. LAURENCE ROSs, DETERRING THE DRINKING DRIVER: LEGAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1982).
64. Nagin, supra note 58, at 12-19.
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are subject to the sanctions, their deterrent effect may be diluted.65
Finally, the added cost to the actor represented by the threat of
punishment (along with other costs) must outweigh the anticipated
gains of the crime. Ultimately, deterrence theory presumes a
rational decision-maker who weighs the expected benefits of
criminal activity against the risk and perceived consequences of
apprehension and punishment. Conditions affecting this calculus
may vary in different localities and among different groups of
offenders, contributing to variability in the deterrent effect of new
sentencing policies. The upshot is that we have no clear picture of
how enhanced criminal sanctions, standing alone, impact criminal
activity.6 6
Even assuming that harsh criminal penalties generally have a
deterrent effect on criminal activity, it is uncertain whether
juveniles will respond in the same way as adults. Two factors that
might differentially affect the responses of youths appear to be in
tension with one another. First, because of their psychosocial
immaturity, youths may be less responsive to the impact of
criminal penalties than adults. Developmental influences on
decision-making that are likely implicated in youthful decisions to
get involved in crime-an inclination to take risks, a tendency to
focus on immediate rather than future consequences, susceptibility
to peer influence, and impulsivity 6 7-in combination may also lead
youths to discount or ignore the prospect of harsh punishment.
Approval by antisocial peers may be a particularly important
influence that undercuts the deterrent effect of severe sanctions. A
self-report study of inner-city youths by Wanda Foglia found that
the threat of legal sanctions had little impact on delinquent
behavior but that peer behavior had a powerful impact, both
through concern about social sanctions and through internalized
norms.68
Although the psychosocial immaturity of adolescents may
undercut the deterrent impact of severe sanctions, a second factor
65. Thus, if criminal arrests and convictions are common in a neighborhood
or peer group, the associated stigma may be diluted. See Nagin, supra note 58.
66. Some criminologists go a step further, arguing that the evidence
supports the conclusion that harsh sanctions do not deter crime. See Doob &
Webster, supra note 62.
67. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. These developmental
psychosocial factors contribute to immature judgment in adolescents and likely
play a role in the criminal choices of juvenile offenders. See ScoT &
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 130-34; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg,
Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REv. 799 (2003).
68. Wanda D. Foglia, Perceptual Deterrence and the Mediating Effect of
Internalized Norms Among Inner-City Teenagers, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ.
414 (1997).
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may cut in the opposite direction. The breadth of the changes in the
juvenile justice regime over the past generation may influence
modem juveniles to consider the prospect of punishment in ways
that delinquents in earlier generations did not. If youths thought
they were insulated from criminal liability because of their juvenile
status under the traditional regime, they now may be more likely to
perceive that this is not so. As we have suggested, the existence of
a justice system that punishes crimes has a general deterrent effect,
even if the marginal deterrent effect of particular policies is
uncertain. The rhetoric of rehabilitation surrounding the traditional
juvenile court may have led youths to perceive a world that was
effectively without legal accountability, a perception that the
punitive reforms may well have altered.
A small number of studies have sought to gauge the deterrent
effect of legislative waiver statutes lowering the age of criminal
court jurisdiction in different states, with mixed results.69 Simon
Singer and his colleagues studied the impact of New York's statute
categorically lowering the age of criminal court jurisdiction and
found no effect on juvenile crime rates over a ten-year period.70 A
study that compared Idaho, a state that adopted a legislative waiver
statute, with Montana and Wyoming, states that did not, found that
crime rates rose in Idaho and declined in the neighboring states.7 1
However, Stephen Levitt examined juvenile crime rates over a 15-
year period from 1978 to 1992, analyzing crime rate changes when
juveniles reach the age at which they become subject to criminal
court jurisdiction. Levitt found that in states with lenient juvenile
systems, rates for violent crime declined sharply at the
jurisdictional age when youths faced adult sanctions, while crime
rates rose when youths attained adult legal status in states with
strict juvenile systems and more lenient adult regimes. Levitt
concluded that the threat of harsh punishment has a substantial
deterrent effect and that much of the increase in juvenile crime in
69. Richard Redding provides a comprehensive review of the research on
the impact of adult punishment on deterrence and recidivism by juvenile
offenders. Richard E. Redding, The Effects of Adjudicating and Sentencing
Juveniles as Adults: Research and Policy Implications, I YOUTH VIOLENCE &
JUV. JUST. 128 (2003).
70. The study examined juvenile crime rates four years before and six years
after the enactment. Simon I. Singer & David McDowall, Criminalizing
Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 521 (1988).
71. Eric L. Jensen & Linda Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of
Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQ. 96 (1994).
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the late 1980s and early 1990s can be attributed to lenient juvenile
sanctions.72
Levitt's study is the most comprehensive effort to link changes
in juvenile crime rates with severity of sanctions in several
jurisdictions. His finding that crime rates decline when youths
move from a very lenient juvenile justice system into the adult
system is not surprising. As we have suggested, youths who
perceive that they are insulated from criminal liability in the
juvenile system may be deterred when they confront the possibility
of tough sanctions in the adult system. The finding that crime rates
increase rather dramatically when youths move from a tough
juvenile system to a lenient adult system is far more puzzling. We
are unfamiliar with states in which criminal court sanctions
systematically are more lenient than juvenile court dispositions
and Levitt does not identify which states he classifies in this way.7
In sum, the research on the general deterrent effect of legal
regulation on juvenile crime is sparse and gives no clear answer to
the question of whether legislative waiver laws and other punitive
measures reduce juvenile crime. The evidence that the reforms
have contributed to the decline in crime rates is weak. Although
Levitt offers some indirect support for the idea that the
transformation of youth crime policy has had a deterrent impact,
most other researchers have not found support for the conclusion
that particular punitive laws deter youths from engaging in
criminal conduct.
D. Specific Deterrence-Do Punitive Laws Reduce Recidivism?
Some researchers have sought to measure the specific deterrent
effect on juvenile crime of the punitive reforms by examining
whether criminal prosecution and punishment reduce recidivism.
Given that the recent legal changes have altered dramatically the
risks facing youths who get involved in crime, it would be useful
72. Steven D. Levitt, Juvenile Crime and Punishment, 106 J. POL.
ECONOMY 1156 (1998).
73. Levitt calculated the relative punitiveness of each state's adult and
juvenile system and then examined the time path of criminal involvement before
and after the age of majority. His measure of the relative punitiveness of a
state's adult and juvenile system involved comparing the ratio of adult prisoners
to adult violent crime in a state with the number of juvenile delinquents to
juvenile violent crimes. This measure has been criticized by Doob and Webster,
who question it in part on the basis that the statistics on which the calculus is
based are unreliable. Doob & Webster, supra note 62. Further, the 22% jump in
violent crime from age 17 to 18 in states where the transition is to a more lenient
adult system is puzzling, given that the criminal system is universally harsher
than the juvenile system.
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to know whether youths who experience harsh punishment then
alter their future behavior. These offenders know about the risk of
punitive sanctions, and they know that they may be caught and
punished. Are they more likely to desist from criminal activity than
those who are dealt with more leniently? The answer should be
"yes" according to deterrence theory and advocates for adult
punishment.
Research based on interviews of young offenders indicates that
being tried in criminal court causes some youths to understand for
the first time that their criminal conduct had serious
consequences.74 As a youth in one study explained, "When you are
a boy, you can be put into a detention home. But you can go to jail
now. Jail ain't no place to go."75 However, it is not clear whether
or to what extent actual involvement in crime is affected by this
awareness. Another study found that youths interviewed upon
release from prison reported intentions not to get involved in crime
again, but that follow-up analysis of recidivism rates suggested that
they had not adhered to their plans. 76 Moreover, some researchers
have found that youths in prison are less likely to forswear future
criminal activity than their counterparts in juvenile facilities.7 7
Lawrence Sherman and others have argued that juveniles who are
punished as adults become defiant at the perceived injustice of the
severe sanctions they receive and reject the system as
illegitimate.78 In short, it is not clear whether youths who are tried
and punished as adults learn the lessons that policy makers aim to
teach in a way that deters their antisocial conduct.
Another method of evaluating the specific deterrent effect of
adult sanctions is to compare recidivism rates of youths prosecuted
and punished in the adult system with those who are sanctioned as
74. Richard E. Redding & Elizabeth J. Fuller, What Do Juvenile Offenders
Know About Being Tried as Adults? Implications for Deterrence, 55 Juv. &
FAM. CT. J. 35 (2004). They quote one youth: "Before, I thought that since I'm a
juvenile I could do just about anything and just get six months if I got caught."
Id. at 39.
75. Barry Glassner et al., A Note on the Deterrent Effect of Juvenile vs.
Adult Jurisdiction, 31 SoC. PROBS. 219 (1983).
76. Anne L. Schneider & Laurie Ervin, Specific Deterrence, Rational
Choice and Decision Heuristics: Applications in Juvenile Justice, 71 Soc. SCI.
Q. 585 (1990).
77. Donna Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Transfer, in THE
CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 227, 250 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin
E. Zimring eds., 2000); see also Martin Forst, Jeffrey Fagan & T. Scott Vivona,
Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the
Treatment-Custody Dichotomy, 40 JUv. & FAM. CT. J. I (1989).
78. Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A
Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445 (1993).
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juveniles. Most studies undertaking this comparison have found
higher recidivism rates among juveniles tried and punished as
adults. However, these studies often are seriously flawed by
selection bias in that the two groups of youths differed in other
ways that may have affected recidivism. For example, transferred
youths may have been involved in more serious criminal activity or
had more serious criminal records and thus have been more likely
to recidivate ex ante.79 In other studies, differences in the length of
the incarceration period make comparison difficult." But two
studies in the 1990s tried with more success to control for these
differences. One group of researchers led by Donna Bishop and
Charles Frazier compared a group of 2,700 Florida youths
transferred to criminal court, mostly based on prosecutors'
discretionary authority under Florida's direct-file statute, with a
carefullr matched group of youths retained in the juvenile
system. In another study, Jeffrey Fagan and his colleagues
compared 15- and 16-year-old youths charged with robbery and
burglary in several counties in metropolitan New York and in
demographically similar counties in New Jersey.8 2 The legal
settings differed in that New York juveniles who are charged with
robbery and burglary are automatically dealt with in the adult
system at age 15 under that state's legislative waiver statute, while
79. See, e.g., Marcy Rasmussen Podkapacz & Barry C. Feld, The End of the
Line: An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
449 (1996). In this study, the authors concluded that the transfer process selected
on the basis of seriousness of the offense. These youths also had more serious
criminal records. The researchers found that the 58% of youths waived to
criminal court committed new offenses within two years of incarceration, versus
42% of youths retained in juvenile court.
80. One example is a study by Robert Barnoski examining the effect on
recidivism of adult sentencing under Washington's statute mandating adult
processing of youths charged with certain crimes. The study found that adult
sanctions had no short-term effect on reoffending. See Barnoski, supra note 29,
at 21-23. The study is of limited value because, at the time of the study, only
23% of the youths sentenced under the automatic transfer statute had been
released. Further, because the statutory change was relatively recent (and
because many youths in the study were still incarcerated), it was not possible to
compare long-term effects on recidivism.
81. Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court:
Does It Make a Diference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171 (1996); Bishop & Frazier,
supra note 77.
82. Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Impacts of Juvenile and Criminal
Court Sanctions on Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 LAW & POL'Y REv. 77
(1996); Jeffrey Fagan, Aaron Kupchik & Akiva Liberman, Be Careful What You
Wish for: Legal Sanctions and Public Safety Among Adolescent Offenders in
Juvenile and Criminal Court (Columbia Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper
No. 03-61, 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=491202.
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in New Jersey, transfer is rarely used and the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over almost all youths charged with these crimes.
Fagan found that youths convicted of robbery in criminal court
were rearrested and incarcerated at a higher rate than those who
were dealt with in the juvenile system, but that rates were
comparable for burglary, a less serious crime. The risk of re-arrest
within three years of "street time" was 29% lower for the New
Jersey youths convicted of robbery in juvenile court than for the
New York juveniles who were sanctioned in the criminal system.
The study also examined the number of days until rearrest and
found a similar pattern; the youths sentenced for robbery in
criminal court reoffended sooner than their juvenile court
counterparts (457 days after first release for the criminal court
offenders versus 553 days for juvenile court offenders.) There was
no difference between the two groups convicted of burglary.
Recidivism was not affected by sentence length; longer sentences
were not more effective at deterring recidivism than shorter
sentences. The upshot is that youths convicted of robbery who
were punished as adults were more likely to recidivate than youths
who were dealt with in the juvenile system. 83
The findings of the Florida study also suggest that juvenile
sanctions may reduce recidivism more effectively than criminal
punishment. This study measured only rearrest rates and found
lower rates for youths who were retained in juvenile court than
youths who were transferred. The follow-ut period in this study
was relatively brief-less than two years. During this period,
29% of the transferred youths were rearrested as compared to 19%
of the youths in the juvenile system. The researchers also
calculated yearly rearrest rates, which was .54 offenses per year for
the transferred group versus .32 for the retained youths.
Transferred youths who were rearrested were apprehended sooner
after their release than juvenile system youths-135 days after
release versus 227 days. Youths who were incarcerated in the adult
system received longer sentences; the mean number of days served
was 245 versus 90 days served by those who were incarcerated in
the juvenile system. As in the New York-New Jersey study, longer
sentences did not have a deterrent effect.
The studies finding that adult punishment may contribute to
recidivism in young offenders charged with violent crimes seem to
83. Fagan, Kupchik & Liberman, supra note 82. Robbery is classified as
serious violent crime because it involves a threat of the use of force. Burglary
does not and for this reason is a less serious crime.
84. Bishop et al., supra note 81. The period for measuring recidivism was
from the date of case closing in 1987 until December 31, 1988.
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undercut the claimed crime-reduction benefits of the recent
reforms. The findings should be viewed with caution, however. In
both studies, the two groups of offenders (or the two settings in
Fagan's study) may differ from one another in subtle ways other
than in the sanction the youths received. These researchers have
mitigated this problem far better than earlier studies: Fagan by
comparing two jurisdictions that dealt with the same offenses
differently and Bishop and Frazier by matching each youth with a
counterpart on several variables, including criminal charges,
number of prior referrals, and most serious prior offense.
Nonetheless, it is possible that, in Florida, prosecutors used other,
more subtle distinctions as a basis of filing charges in criminal
court such that more antisocial youths were dealt with in the adult
system. Moreover, as the researchers concede, the police may have
monitored youths who had been in the criminal system more
closely than others, resulting in a higher rearrest rate. In Fagan's
study, New York prosecutors had charging discretion that may
have affected the composition of the study cohort. For example,
15-year-old youths who seemed less culpable may have been
charged with lesser crimes than robbery, so that they would not be
prosecuted as adults. Thus, the cohort of young robbers in that
state may be more serious offenders than in New Jersey, where
almost all youths are retained in the juvenile system, giving
prosecutors little reason to discriminate in their charging
decisions. Moreover, law enforcement may be more aggressive
and effective in New York than in New Jersey, leading to higher
rearrest rates in the former jurisdiction.
Given these limitations, it is fair to ask whether these studies
are helpful in determining whether young offenders subject to
tough sanctions are more or less likely to offend in the future. But,
at a minimum, this research provides no support for the contention
that criminal punishment will effectively reduce recidivism.
Indeed, almost all of the rather sparse empirical evidence points to
the conclusion that it does not have this effect. Absent randomized
experiments in which offenders convicted of the same crimes are
randomly assigned to either adult or juvenile sanctions
(experiments that few, if any, jurisdictions would permit), non-
experimental evidence from studies like those of Fagan or Bishop
and Frazier provides the best available evidence, and these studies
do not support sanctioning juveniles as adults. Ultimately, the
advocates of punitive policies have very little empirical evidence
to support their claims about the benefits of tough policies.
85. Further, it is difficult to explain why recidivism rates did not differ for
burglary offenders in the New York-New Jersey study.
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E. Lowering Juvenile Crime Rates Through Incapacitation
Youths who are inclined to commit crimes are constrained
from doing so if they are incarcerated. Thus, although it is unclear
whether harsh sanctions generally deter youths from criminal
activity or reduce recidivism, imprisonment certainly can reduce
crime through incapacitation. 6 Supporters of the recent reforms
may point to this reality as powerful evidence that tough sanctions
indeed can lower crime rates, despite the lack of evidence that
young criminals are deterred. The unassailable logic is that the
more time young criminals spend in prison, the less time they are
on the street getting in trouble.
Although this prescription is logical, it is problematic as social
policy. Incapacitation is effective (in the short term at least), but it
is very costly as a means of preventing crime. Deterrence operates
by influencing the choices of potential offenders, and thus, if it is
effective, the overall economic and social cost of crime should be
reduced: fewer prison cells are needed, fewer victims are created,
and youths live their lives in more socially (and personally)
beneficial ways. In contrast, as we have seen, confinement of
youths for long periods in correctional facilities carries a high
economic cost and other social costs as well-particularly if the
specific deterrent effect is weak.
There is another important consideration to be weighed.
Almost all incarcerated youths will be released at some point to
rejoin society; thus, the impact of incarceration on reoffending and
generally on offenders' future lives must be considered in
calculating its costs and benefits. For some youths, the risk of
recidivism is high at the outset (based on their prior record, for
example), and if they caused serious harm through their criminal
activity, the costs of extensive incapacitation may be justified on
social welfare grounds. But many youths are not in this category,
and as lawmakers have expanded the category of young offenders
86. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish whether fluctuations in crime
rates in response to changes in criminal sanctions are a result of incapacitation
or deterrence, and deterrence studies have sometimes been critiqued on this
ground. For example, Steven Levitt, in a study of the impact of a federal court
mandate that Alabama reduce its prison population to prevent overcrowding,
concluded that an increase in crime that followed the judicial order was largely
the result of weakened deterrence. Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison
Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding
Litigation, Ill Q.J. EcoN. 319 (1996). Anthony Doob and Cheryl Webster
challenge this conclusion, arguing that, because many prisoners were released
and prison was used more sparingly in response to the court order, many
criminals were on the street where they were free to commit crimes. Doob &
Webster, supra note 62.
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who are subject to harsh sanctions to include moderate-risk
offenders, the marginal benefits of incapacitation have declined. At
some point, the cost of sanctions involving long periods of
incarceration will exceed the benefits, particularly if these costs
include increasing the risk of reoffending in the future.
F. Summary
The research that we reviewed provides no clear answer to the
question of how much the criminalization of juvenile justice policy
contributed to the declining crime rate of the past decade. Our
review leads us to conclude that the punitive reforms likely have
had some effect, at least in the short term, through increased
incapacitation-both in the adult and juvenile systems-and
possibly through general deterrence as well. Theory and research
on adults support the view that a justice regime that signals to
youths that they will be held accountable for their misdeeds may
deter crime more effectively than one in which they think their
status as juveniles shields them from punishment. 87 It is not at all
clear, however, whether the legal changes of the past generation
are optimal or excessive as the means of bringing about changed
perceptions. It is plausible that more lenient juvenile crime policy
grounded in accountability and certainty of sanction may shape
perceptions in ways that influence behavior as effectively as the
current regime with a more modest budgetary impact and fewer
collateral costs.
Beyond this, the evidence does not support the claims by
supporters of the punitive reforms that juveniles will be deterred by
tough sanctions or that the reforms are responsible for the decline
in juvenile crime rates that began in the mid-1990s. In many states,
such as California, juvenile crime rates had been steadily declinin
for several years before legislatures enacted tough reforms.
Moreover, although the research findings are mixed, most studies
find no evidence that the enactment of automatic transfer laws has
discouraged youths generally from getting involved in crime.
Somewhat more surprisingly, perhaps, the research does not
indicate that those young offenders who are sentenced to prison for
violent offenses are less likely to offend upon release by virtue of
that experience; indeed, the existing studies suggest that they have
87. This would be compatible with the uncontroversial view among
criminologists that having a criminal justice system has a general deterrent
effect as compared to a world without criminal sanctions. See Redding & Fuller,
supra note 74, at 39; supra note 58.
88. Scort & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 105.
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higher recidivism rates than their counterparts in the juvenile
system and that sentence severity does not appear to affect
recidivism. In short, the argument that public safety will be
promoted if youths get "adult time for adult crime" has little
empirical support. Given that this claim is at the heart of the
preventive argument for harsh sanctions, the case for get-tough
policies is far weaker than its supporters acknowledge.
III. ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND OPTIMAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
INTERVENTIONS
The dearth of evidence supporting the effectiveness of tough
sanctions in deterring youthful criminal activity becomes less
puzzling when we consider the responses of young offenders in
light of the scientific knowledge about adolescence. First, as we
have suggested, due to their psychosocial immaturity, teens on the
street deciding whether to hold up a convenience store may simply
be less capable than adults of considering the sanctions they will
face. Thus, the developmental influences on decision-making that
likely shape their decisions to get involved in criminal activity may
also make adolescents less responsive to the threat of criminal
sanctions. 89 Beyond this, however, sanctions themselves may vary
in their impact on the future developmental trajectories of
adolescents in ways that are important to recidivism. The research
supports the conclusion that prison provides an aversive social
context that inhibits youths from accomplishing developmental
tasks of adolescence that are essential to the transition to non-
criminal adulthood. In contrast, the juvenile system potentially can
do a better job of responding to developmental needs. Although
long incarceration in any institutional setting, whether adult or
juvenile, is unlikely to have a beneficial impact on development,
many juvenile facilities and community programs offer youths
developmental settings that can facilitate healthy maturation. In
general, scientific knowledge about adolescence reinforces the
lesson that a legal regime that aims to reduce recidivism will deal
with most young offenders in the juvenile system.
89. This raises the question of whether imposing harsher sanctions on
juveniles than on adults might be justified as necessary to achieve comparable
levels of deterrence. This response would be problematic on proportionality
grounds if juvenile offenders, due to developmental immaturity, are less
culpable than adults. On social welfare grounds, increasing punishment
ultimately seems unlikely to be an effective means of reducing the social cost of
juvenile crime, given the high costs of incapacitation and the predicted impact
on recidivism of adult punishment.
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In this Part, we first explore lessons from developmental
psychology and criminology that have important implications for
correctional policy in a regime that aims to reduce crime. Then in
light of this knowledge, we examine adult prisons and juvenile
programs as contexts for development. Finally we ask the question,
"What characterizes the programs that are effective in reducing
crime in young offenders?" The evidence is clear that programs
that are grounded in developmental science have superior
outcomes and offer good value for society's investment in crime
reduction.
A. Lessons from Developmental Research
Developmental research offers two lessons that together
underscore the importance of correctional interventions in shaping the
trajectories of young offenders' lives. First, many adolescents engage
in criminal activity, but are likely to desist as they mature into
adulthood. Developmentalists explain that risky experimentation is a
part of identity formation for many teens. Thus, psychologist
Terrie Moffitt has observed that, for adolescent boys, gettin
involved in criminal activity is "a normal part of teenage life."
But most youths mature out of their criminal tendencies; only
about 5% are incipient career criminals. 91 Criminologists find that
the crime rate peaks at age 17 and then declines steeply.92 The
upshot is that much adolescent criminal activity is "normative"
behavior, as psychologists use this term, and not indicative of bad
character or criminal predisposition. In responding to the criminal
conduct of juveniles, society has an important interest in
facilitating their transition to non-criminal adulthood.
The second lesson of developmental science is just as
important to achieving the goal of reducing the social cost of
juvenile crime. Mid- and late-adolescence are periods in which
individuals normally make substantial progress in acquiring and
coordinating skills that are essential to self-sufficient adulthood.
First, individuals begin to acquire basic educational and vocational
skills to enable them to function in the workplace as productive
members of society. They also acquire the social skills necessary
to establish stable intimate relationships and to cooperate in
90. See Moffitt, supra note 12.
91. See supra note 12 (describing studies finding that a small percent of
youths commit most crimes). Moffitt labeled this group "life-course-persistent"
offenders. Moffitt, supra note 12.
92. Alex R. Piquero, David P. Farrington & Alfred Blumstein, The Criminal
Career Paradigm, in 30 CRIME AND JUSTICE 359 (Michael Tonry ed., 2003).
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groups. Finally, they must begin to learn to behave responsibly
without external supervision and to set meaningful personal goals
for themselves. For most individuals, the process of completing
these developmental tasks extends into early adulthood, but
making substantial progress in adolescence is important.
This process of development toward psychosocial maturity is
one of reciprocal interaction between the individual and her social
context. Healthy social contexts provide "opportunity structures"
that facilitate normative development, but social contexts can also
undermine this process. 93 Several environmental conditions are
particularly important-the presence or absence of an authoritative
adult parent figure; association with prosocial or antisocial peers;
and participation or non-participation in educational,
extracurricular, or employment activities that facilitate the
development of autonomous decision-making and critical-thinking
skills. For the youth in the justice system, the correctional setting
becomes the environment for social development and may affect
whether he makes the transition to conventional adult roles
successfully. 9 4
Normative teens who get involved in crime do so, in part,
because their choices are driven by developmental influences
typical of adolescence. In theory, they should desist from criminal
behavior and mature into reasonably responsible adults as they
attain psychosocial maturity. We have indirect evidence that many
young offenders follow this process as predicted; the crime rate
drops off sharply in late adolescence, and the research shows that
desistance is often linked to achieving stable employment or a
satisfying marriage.95 Whether youths successfully make the
transition to conventional adult roles, however, depends in part on
whether their social context provides opportunity structures for
93. Urie Bronfenbrenner & P.A. Morris, The Ecology of Developmental
Processes, in HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 993 (5th ed. 1998); He Len
Chung, Michelle Little & Laurence Steinberg, The Transition to Adulthood for
Adolescents in the Juvenile Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, in ON
YOUR OwN WITHOUT A NET 68 (D. Wayne Osgood et al. eds., 2005).
94. Chung, Little & Steinberg, supra note 93.
95. JOHN H. LAUB & ROBERT J. SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS,
DIVERGENT LIVES: DELINQUENT BOYS To AGE 70 (2003) [hereinafter SHARED
BEGINNINGS]; ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE MAKING:
PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993); John H. Laub &
Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1
(2001). Sampson and Laub treat marriage and employment as fortuitous
exogenous events that facilitate desistance. It seems more likely that some
youths are able to succeed in these adult roles because they have attained
psychosocial maturity, while others who fail to successfully complete
developmental tasks do not make this transition.
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successfully completing the developmental tasks described
above.9 6
The correctional environment may influence the developmental
trajectories of normative adolescents in the justice system in
important ways. Factors such as the attitudes and roles of adult
supervisors; the identity and behavior of other offenders; and the
availability or absence of good educational, skill building, and
rehabilitative programs shape the social context of youths in the
adult and juvenile systems. These social influences may affect the
inclination of young offenders to desist or persist in their criminal
activities. The correctional context may also facilitate or impede
their development into adults who can function adequately in
society-in the workplace, in marriage or other intimate unions,
and as citizens.
B. Prisons as Developmental Settings
In most states, youths in prison are treated like other inmates,
receiving few or no special accommodations or programs in
recognition of their developmental needs. Many features of the
typical prison make it a harmful environment for adolescent
offenders.9 7 First, prisons are generally much larger institutions
than juvenile facilities. According to one estimate, more than 40%
of prisons house more than 500 prisoners; many have an inmate
population of more than 1,000.9 Even the largest training schools
house on averae about 125 youths, and other residential programs
are far smaller. Institutional size affects the experience of inmates
96. Laurence Steinberg, He Len Chung & Michelle Little, Reentry of Young
Offenders from the Justice System: A Developmental Perspective, 2 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 21 (2004).
97. Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier have provided an excellent
comparison of youths' experiences in prison and juvenile facilities based on
their research and other studies. Our discussion of these issues draws on their
account. See Bishop and Frazier, supra note 77, at 251-61. Another useful study
by Forst, Fagan, and Vivona compared reports of their incarceration experience
by youths on release from prison with that of youths on release from training
schools. See Forst, Fagan & Vivona, supra note 77. The authors of one national
survey summarized their findings by reporting that they found "little evidence of
efforts to customize programs for youthful offenders." JAMES AUSTIN, KELLY
DEDEL JOHNSON & MARIA GREGORIOU, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT, at xi
(2000).
98. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1995, at v (1997).
99. OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 24 (1994).
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in several ways. In large institutions, violence levels are higher,
staff-inmate relationships are more impersonal, and the
organizational structure is more rigid.' 00 Researchers have found
that recidivism rates among juvenile offenders increase with the
size of the institution.10o
The function of prison is to punish and confine criminals and in
the organization and staffing reflect that purpose. More than two-
thirds of prison employees are uniformed guards and other security
staff whose job is to maintain order and security by monitoring
inmates. 102 Although some educational and counseling programs
may be provided, these services are not readily available and are
often add-ons provided by adjunct staff and not integrated into
prison life. Some states provide special instructional programs in
prisons for minors, but this is by no means the norm, and young
prisoners have no right to educational services comparable to those
offered to non-institutionalized youths. 1 03 One study reported that
the teacher-to-student ratio in prisons was 1:100, and that fewer
than 40% of inmates received any academic instruction.104
Counseling, therapeutic, and occupational training staffs generally
are scarce in prisons; fewer than 10% of prisoners in one study
were involved in any kind of counseling program.'os
These dimensions of prison organization shape the experience of
youths incarcerated in the adult system in ways that are likely to
undermine healthy psychosocial development. First, adult authority
figures are unlikely to have a positive influence. Researchers report
that correctional officers, whose job is to maintain security, have
impersonal, authoritarian, and often hostile relationships with
inmates. Not surprisingly, young prisoners, in turn, express hostility
toward staff, who are perceived as being unconcerned about
inmates' welfare and uninterested in helping young inmates to
100. Kenneth Adams, Adjusting to Prison Life, 16 CRIME & JUST. 275 (1992).
101. RICHARD A. MENDEL, AM. YOUTH POLICY FORUM, LESS HYPE, MORE
HELP: REDUCING JUVENILE CRIME, WHAT WORKS-AND WHAT DOESN'T (2000).
102. See AUSTIN, JOHNSON & GREGORIOU, supra note 97; Bishop et al.,
supra note 81.
103. See AUSTIN, JOHNSON & GREGORIOU, supra note 97. In Tunstall ex rel.
Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691 (Wash. 2000), the Washington Supreme Court
found that juveniles held in adult facilities had no right to general elementary or
secondary educational services at the same level of quality as their non-
institutionalized peers. See also Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52, 71 (2d
Cir. 2006).
104. ALLEN BECK ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE
PRISON INMATES, 1991 (1993).
105. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 77, at 256. Bishop & Frazier suggest that
the custodial staff tend to view treatment professionals with suspicion and
hostility. Their role is not integral to the operation of the prison.
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develop social skills, improve relationships, or deal with
problems.to6 Further, with little in the way of education,
occupational training, or rehabilitation, many prisons provide
minimal positive structure for inmates' daily lives. In these facilities,
much time is spent in cells or in the prison yard with other prisoners
under the surveillance of guards on the perimeter.Io0
Frequent opportunities for interaction among prisoners together
with distant relationships with staff combine to create an aversive
developmental context. Although youths are separated from adults
in some prisons, this is not the case in most facilities.' 08 According
to reports by young prisoners, experienced criminals teach them
strategies and methods for engaging in criminal activity and
avoiding detection.109 Young inmates are also more likely to be
victimized than older prisoners or their counterparts in juvenile
facilities; ten times as many youths in prison report sexual assaults
as youths in juvenile facilities.110 In some facilities, young
prisoners who are targets of older predators are isolated for their
own protection, apparently because isolating victims is easier than
restraining attackers.' Most prisoners decline to report
victimization to prison officials; to do so is a serious violation of
prison norms against snitching and may only increase vulnerability
to attack. Young prisoners often attempt to protect themselves
from victimization by responding aggressively to threats, which
can result in disciplinary sanctions.
In general, juvenile inmates engage in more misconduct and
are subject to administrative segregation and disciplinary sanctions
(such as exclusion from work assignments, programs, and good-
time credits) far more often than older prisoners. To some extent,
the aggressive misconduct of young inmates probably reflects the
reality that some youths in prison are tough, antisocial individuals.
However, developmental influences may also be a factor. Being
more sensitive to peer approval than are adults, adolescents may
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. AUSTIN, JOHNSON & GREGORIOU, supra note 97. States with Youthful
Offender statutes, like New York, separate youths in adult prisons from adults.
Austin and colleagues found that juvenile and adult prisoners were separated in
13% of facilities. For a guide to developmentally-based treatment of juveniles in
adult prisons (emphasizing separation from adult prisoners), see AM. BAR
Ass'N, YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2001).
109. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 77, at 257.
110. Forst, Fagan & Vivona, supra note 77.
111. Id.
112. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 77; see also Richard McCorkle, Personal
Precautions to Violence in Prison, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 160 (1992).
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engage in aggressive conduct to prove their toughness and
masculinity and thereby attain higher peer status.' 1 3
The upshot is that the experience of imprisonment is more
aversive for adolescents than for older prisoners. Unlike adults,
adolescents are in a formative developmental stage that powerfully
influences the future trajectory of their lives. Prisons provide
barren and hostile environments for developing essential capacities
and skills that are necessary for making the transition to
conventional adult roles. In most facilities, little effort is made to
prepare youths to function in the workplace as adults or to develop
the interpersonal skills necessary to establish stable intimate
relationships. Prisons also function as apprentice programs for
professional careers in crime. The available adult authority figures
are guards who are distant and hostile, and many adult prisoners
either threaten young prisoners or influence them to become more
proficient criminals.
Moreover, the harmful effects of imprisonment follow young
offenders after they are released in ways that amplify its negative
impact on psychosocial development. A felony conviction is a
stigmatic signal that carries legal disabilities such as
disenfranchisement and exclusion from military service (which has
been found to be another pathway to desistance for young
offenders). 114 Just as important are the informal handicaps that
undermine the ability of young felons to move into conventional
adult roles. Disclosure of a criminal record is mandatory in many
settings and often the criminal conviction will bar educational and
employment opportunities. Further, a youth who has been in prison
may find it much harder to develop social relationships with peers
who are not involved in crime. Thus, youths who serve time in
prison are severely handicapped in their efforts to find meaningful
legal employment or to establish stable intimate relationships or
marriages, the two most important factors associated with
desistance from involvement in crime.
113. Bishop and Frazier offer this hypothesis. Bishop & Frazier, supra note
77, at 257-58; see also Marilyn McShane & Frank Williams, The Prison
Adjustment of Juvenile Offenders, 35 CRIME & DELINQ. 254 (1989). These
researchers found that serious and violent juvenile offenders in prison engaged
in misconduct at a rate twice that of similar offenders age 17 to 21.
114. Sampson and Laub found that military service, along with marriage and
stable employment, was another pathway to desistance for many young
offenders. LAUB & SAMPSON, SHARED BEGINNINGS, supra note 95, at 41-51.
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C. Juvenile Facilities as Developmental Settings
Juvenile facilities are far from optimal as settings for healthy
adolescent development under the best conditions, and many
institutions for young offenders are almost indistinguishable from
prisons. Some facilities, however, provide young offenders with
programs, supervision, and supportive correctional environments
that, in combination, are less likely to harm their prospects for
becoming productive adults. At their best, they may also contribute
positively to the transition from antisocial adolescent to normative
adult. In other words, prisons and juvenile facilities tend to differ
in several ways that may be important to their developmental
impact on confined youths. These differences may shed light on
the question of why youths who are imprisoned do not appear to be
more effectively deterred than youths in the juvenile system,
despite the aversive nature of the prison experience.
Although the regulation of youth crime has become harsher
over the past generation, juvenile facilities and programs in many
states continue to recognize that convicted youths are adolescents
with developmental needs. Thus, juvenile facilities tend to offer
environments that are less purely custodial than typical prisons. In
many juvenile facilities, a relatively large number of line staff
perform educational and counseling duties. Ninety-five percent of
training schools have a ratio of at least one teacher per 15 youths,
and two-thirds have one counselor for every ten youths.115 Even in
states that have enthusiastically embraced punitive reforms, the
programs in and organization of juvenile facilities often are based
on a developmental therapeutic model. For example, in Florida,
which transfers many youths and imposes harsh adult sentences on
juveniles,11 6 the juvenile system's correctional programs are based
on empirically-validated cognitive behavioral principles that guide
staff behavior and staff-resident interaction. 7 Residents' daily
115. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra
note 99.
116. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court reviewed two cases in which
Florida youths received sentences of life without parole for non-homicide
offenses and found this sentence to be unconstitutional for juveniles under the
Eighth Amendment. Most of the cases in which this sentence was imposed were
Florida cases. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
117. Cognitive behavior therapy is the basis for many successful delinquency
programs. See J.J. Platt & M.F. Prout, Cognitive-Behavioral Theory and
Interventions for Crime and Delinquency, in BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO
CRIAE AND DELINQUENCY 477 (Edward Morris & Curtis Braukmann eds.,
1987).
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schedules include academic classes, skills training, counseling, and
* -* 118
recreational activities.
There is some evidence that these distinctive programmatic
aspects of the juvenile system affect the social environment of
youths in ways that contribute positively to psychological
development. Self-report studies find that youths in juvenile
facilities have far more positive attitudes toward staff than do
young prisoners in the adult system. In general, the former group
report that staff are concerned about their welfare, encourage them
to participate in programs, and attempt to help them develop social
skills and solve problems.119 Offenders in juvenile facilities are
also more likely than youths in prison to say that they intend to
avoid criminal activity in the future. When asked to evaluate
programs, youths reported benefitting the most from long-term
intensive programs in which they developed relationships with
caring counselors, particularly programs that were directed at
improving social skills and self control. 120 In effect, these youths
reported that staff in their facilities provided the social conditions
and experiences that research indicates facilitate the attainment of
psychosocial competence. As we will see shortly, the
characteristics of programs that youths found most helpful are
those that researchers have correlated with reduced recidivism.'21
D. Youths in Community-Based Programs
Even under contemporary law, a large percentage of youths
serve all or part of their delinquency dispositions in their
communities rather than in correctional facilities.12 2 For many
offenders, community sanctions may be optimal-they are lower
in cost than confinement in a correctional facility and offer a better
context for navigating the transition to productive adulthood. Many
118. See Bishop & Frazier, supra note 77.
119. See id.; Forst, Fagan & Vivona, supra note 77.
120. Bishop & Frazier, supra note 77.
121. See infra notes 130-43 and accompanying text.
122. See SNYDER & SICKIJUND, supra note 21 (citing Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention statistics showing that 54% of youths
receive some form of probation). Community sanctions today extend to many
youths who a generation ago were processed informally and diverted from the
justice system. In Boston, for example, probation officers visit their charges'
homes unannounced in the evening hours to check on compliance with curfews.
See Operation Night Light-Boston, MA, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ.
PREvENTION, http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/pubs/gunviolence/profile33.html (last
visited Aug. 22, 2010). Some research suggests, however, that closely




normative adolescents will be better off if they are not removed
from their families, schools, and communities. For non-delinquent
youths, these social environments provide the opportunity
structures for completing the developmental tasks that are the basis
of psychosocial maturity. Residential facilities, even those that are
organized to respond to adolescents' developmental needs, are
generally not ideal settings for acquiring the skills necessary to
make a successful transition to adulthood, particularly if youths are
confined for long periods. Delinquent youths will ultimately return
to their communities and must be able to function in the social
contexts that constitute their world.
An obvious problem with community sanctions for some
delinquent youths is that their families, peer groups,
neighborhoods, and schools may undermine rather than support
healthy psychosocial development. Criminologists explain that
toxic social contexts contribute to youthful offending. 23 Young
offenders are likely to continue their involvement in criminal
activity unless something changes in the setting or in their ability
to avoid negative influences. Youths whose friends are involved in
crime, whose parents are deficient, and whose schools are
dangerous settings that lack resources may find it hard to stay in
the community and not get into trouble again. Thus, an important
goal of any community-based disposition is to minimize the impact
of negative social contexts by providing delinquent youths with
tools to deal in self-protective ways with their social environment
and also to facilitate and reinforce settings that promote healthy
development.124 As we will see shortly, these strategies
characterize programs that are successful at reducing recidivism.
The goal of changing the interaction between the youth and his
social environment is also important for the offender who returns
to his community after a period of incarceration. A "reentry"
period of structured supervision and support can enhance the
youth's ability to function in his community in ways that minimize
the likelihood that he will simply reconnect with antisocial peers
and resume his involvement in criminal activity. The
developmental benefits of programs in correctional facilities can be
lost when youths return to their communities and neighborhoods
unless they receive support during the transition. Recent research
123. Jeffrey Fagan, Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime, 6 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 507, 535-38 (1999); Jeffrey Fagan, Contexts of Choice by
Adolescents in Criminal Events, in YOUTH ON TRLkI 371 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert Schwartz eds., 2000).
124. One of the most successful community-based programs, Multi-Systemic
Therapy, uses an ecological approach. See infra notes 133-36 and
accompanying text.
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indicates that youths who have been released from institutional
placement are more likely to reoffend when they return to
environments characterized by bad parenting and, especially, the
presence of antisocial peers.' Increasingly, effective correctional
programs include intensive community probation to assure that
interventions have a lasting impact.
Community sanctions grounded in developmental knowledge
are quite different from those employed by the traditional juvenile
court, where loosely supervised probation was a standard
disposition for less serious and first-time offenders. If offenders
who are subject to community sanctions are not carefully
supervised, and if the criminogenic influences in their social
environment are not addressed, many will not desist from criminal
activity. Moreover, an important lesson of the deterrence research
is that young offenders must understand that they will be punished
for the harms they cause. The traditional courts, in meting out
community probation (and little else) to many young offenders,
failed to communicate this message and apparently achieved little
deterrence. Some localities have found that sanctions that include
not only therapeutic and skill-building programs, but also
compensation to victims, community service, close supervision,
and the enforcement of probation conditions such as curfews and
orders to avoid antisocial peers, are more effective in promoting
accountability and reducing recidivism.126 Supporters of harsh
sanctions are suspicious of community-based programs, in part
because they assume that public protection requires incarceration
of many young offenders. Whether this is true depends in part on
the effectiveness of community-based programs in reducing
recidivism. Although traditional probation has not been successful
at achieving this goal, developmental knowledge suggests that
interventions that alter criminogenic social contexts and provide
youths with tools that can assist them to attain psychosocial
maturity may be more effective. If community interventions are
effective in reducing reoffending by youths who otherwise would
be confined, they may be superior on public welfare grounds,
given that they are less costly financially and less disruptive to
young offenders' lives. We turn next to the empirical evidence,
which indicates that some community-based programs indeed are
effective at reducing crime.
125. Edward Mulvey, Maryfrances Porter & He Len Chung, Building
Pathways out of Crime and Delinquency for Serious and Violent Juvenile
Offenders 16-20 (2002) (unpublished manuscript).
126. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 21. Figures show increases in formal
versus informal processing since the mid-1980s.
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E. What Works with Young Offenders?
The evidence we have presented thus far generally supports a
policy of retaining most young offenders in the juvenile system as
more likely to promote public welfare than the contemporary
approach of punishing many youths as adults. But juvenile
correctional facilities and programs vary greatly. Some youths are
incarcerated in prison-like training schools, while others receive
loosely supervised probation-neither of which are likely to be
effective at changing antisocial behavior. An important question
therefore is what the juvenile system can offer young offenders
that will be effective at reducing recidivism.
Until the 1990s, most researchers who studied juvenile
delinquency programs might well have answered that the system
had little to offer in the way of effective therapeutic interventions;
the dominant view of social scientists in the 1970s and 1980s was
that "nothing works" to reduce recidivism with young offenders.127
Today the picture is considerably brighter, in large part due to a
substantial body of research produced over the past 15 years
showing that many juvenile programs, both in the community and
in institutional settings, have a substantial crime-reduction effect;
for the most promising programs that effect is in the range of 20 to
30%.128 Moreover, by applying meta-analysis, a relatively new
quantitative method for coding, analyzing, and accurately
comparing the findings of many related studies, researchers are
able to sort the types of interventions that are promising from those
that are ineffective and clarify the attributes of effective
programs.129 An increased focus on research-based programs
127. DOUGLAS LIPTON, ROBERT MARTINSON & MELANIE WILKS, THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT
EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); NEw DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (Susan Martin, Lee Sechrest & Robin Redner eds., 1981);
Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
35 PUB. INT. 22 (1975).
128. PETER GREENWOOD, CHANGING LIVES: DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AS
CRIME-CONTROL POLICY (2006); Steve Aos et al., The Comparative Costs and
Benefits of Programs to Reduce Crime, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y (May
2001), http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/costbenefit.pdf.
129. See Mark Lipsey, Can Rehabilitative Programs Reduce the Recidivism
of Young Offenders? An Inquiry into the Effectiveness of Practical Programs, 6
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 611 (1999). Researchers began to use meta-analysis to
evaluate the effectiveness of juvenile programs in about 1990, and numerous
meta-analyses have been undertaken. See id. at 613 n.6. Lipsey's analyses of
juvenile programs are very comprehensive, and he is prominent among
researchers using this now widely-used methodology. See also Aos et al., supra
note 128.
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together with careful outcome evaluation allows policymakers to
assess accurately the impact on recidivism rates of particular
programs to determine whether the economic costs are justified. In
a real sense, these developments have revived rehabilitation as a
realistic goal of juvenile justice interventions.
In general, successful programs are those that attend to the
lessons of developmental psychology, seeking to provide young
offenders with supportive social contexts and assist them in
acquiring the skills necessary to change problem behavior and
attain psychosocial maturity. In his comprehensive meta-analysis
of 400 juvenile programs, Mark Lipsey found that among the most
effective programs in both community and institutional settings
were those that focused on improving social development skills in
the areas of interpersonal relations, self control, academic
performance, and job skills.13 0 Some effective programs focus
directly on developing skills to avoid antisocial behavior, often
through cognitive behavioral therapy, a therapeutic approach with
substantial empirical support.' For example, Aggression
Replacement Training is a cognitive-behavioral intervention that
focuses on anger control, prosocial skill development, and moral
reasoning. Other interventions that have been shown to have a
positive effect on crime reduction focus on strengthening family
support. In Functional Family Therapy, for example, therapists
work in youths' homes to improve emotional connections between
parents and children and strengthen parents' abilities to provide
structure and limits for their children. This approach explicitly
recognizes the importance of authoritative parenting for healthy
130. Mark Lipsey, What Do We Learn from 400 Research Studies on the
Effectiveness of Treatment with Juvenile Delinquents?, in WHAT WORKS:
REDUCING REOFFENDING 63 (James McGuire ed., 1995). Lipsey found a broad
range of programs to have some effectiveness at reducing recidivism (although
results are not always consistent) from formal restitution, to therapeutic
wilderness interventions, to "wraparound" programs that combine intensive
supervision with individualized treatment provided by collaborative interagency
teams.
131. Cognitive behavioral therapy is employed in many juvenile correctional
programs, both in residential facilities and community settings. It is a problem-
focused approach that is designed to help individuals identify beliefs, thoughts,
and behaviors that contribute to their problems-in the case of delinquent
youths, to alter contributors to criminal conduct. It has been used extensively
with youths with substance abuse problems that are linked to their criminal
conduct. See Platt & Prout, supra note 117; see also AARON T. BECK,
PRISONERS OF HATE: THE COGNITIVE BASIS OF ANGER, HOSTILITY AND
VIOLENCE (1999); JUDITH S. BECK, COGNITIVE THERAPY: BASICS AND BEYOND
(1995); Mark W. Lipsey, Gabrielle L. Chapman & Nana A. Landenberger,
Cognitive-Behavioral Programs for Offenders, 578 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 144 (2001).
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development, as does Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, an
intervention that has been found to be quite effective with high-risk
and chronic offenders. This program places youths with trained
and supervised foster parents for 6 to 12 months, while they also
engage in family therapy with their own parents. This program
involves close supervision and treatment in the home, school, and
community; adult mentoring; and separation from delinquent
peers. 32
One of the most successful interventions with violent and
aggressive youths is Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST), a
community-based program that has been replicated and evaluated
repeatedly for almost 20 years with many groups of juvenile
offenders. MST is thoroughly grounded in developmental
knowledge; it combines cognitive behavioral therapy with an
ecological approach that deals with individual youths in the
multiple social contexts in which they live-their families, peer
groups, schools, and communities-and addresses the factors that
contribute to criminal conduct across these settings. MST
therapists work in teams with small caseloads of four to six
families, providing intensive in-home services. The focus of
treatment is to empower parents with skills and resources to
support their children in avoiding problem behaviors and give
youths the tools to cope with family, peer, and school problems
that can contribute to reinvolvement in criminal activity. 3 3
Controlled studies of MST have shown it to be among the most
effective justice system treatments.' 34 One study compared chronic
and violent offenders receiving MST with a randomly assigned
group who received the standard treatment of supervised probation
and found that MST reduced rates of both reoffending and
incarceration in this group of very high risk offenders. The MST
youths had significantly lower recidivism rates over a 59 week
period despite the fact that they remained in the community an
132. See GREENWOOD, supra note 128; Robert Barnoski, Outcome
Evaluation of Washington State's Research-Based Programs for Juvenile
Offenders, WASH. ST. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y (Jan. 2004), http://www.wsipp.
wa.gov/rptfiles/04-01-1201.pdf.
133. Scott W. Henggeler, Gary B. Melton & Linda A. Smith, Family
Preservation Using Multisystemic Therapy: An Effective Alternative to
Incarcerating Serious Juvenile Offenders, 60 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 953 (1992). One role of MST therapists is to expand natural social
support systems for the family (extended family, neighbors, church members,
etc.) and to remove impediments to effective functioning (parents, substance
abuse, stress). See OJJDP Model Programs Guide: Multisystemic Therapy, OFF.
JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/mpg/mpg
ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=363 (last visited Aug. 22, 2010).
134. Aos et al., supra note 128.
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average of 73 days more than youths in the control group during
that period.135 Moreover, a two-year follow-up study showed that
youths who received MST continued to reoffend at a substantially
lower rate than those who got standard dispositional treatment
(although the rates for both groups were relatively high).136
Not all juvenile programs are effective at reducing crime. Two
popular programs-military boot camps and "scared straight"
programs, in which youths are taken to adult prisons and lectured
on the perils they face if they persist in their criminal ways-
actually increase recidivism; young offenders who participate in
these programs commit more crimes than other youths.137
Moreover, even effective programs can fail if they are not well
implemented. Some studies have found substantial variations in
recidivism rates due to differences in the quality of staff and
compliance with program protocols.13 8 This suggests that general
replication in the justice system of effective "model programs"
may sometimes not produce the positive results that program
developers achieve. Beyond this, duration of the treatment and
amount of contact time are often positively correlated with
effectiveness. Lipsey's meta-analysis found that those programs
that exceeded the mean in these dimensions were more effective at
reducing3 9recidivism than briefer programs that involved less
contact.
Many treatment programs in the justice system are more
expensive than standard probation or parole, the alternative to
which they often are compared. MST, for example, costs
approximately $5,000 per youth.140 How can policymakers decide
whether the benefits of particular programs justify their cost to
taxpayers? Recently state governments have begun to focus on the
cost effectiveness of criminal and juvenile sanctions and have
135. Henggeler, Melton & Smith, supra note 133.
136. Scott W. Henggeler et al., Family Preservation Using Multisystemic
Treatment: Long-Term Follow-up to a Clinical Trial with Serious Juvenile
Offenders, 2 J. CHLD & FAm. STUD. 283 (1993). Eighty percent of the control
group had re-offended, compared with 60% of the group receiving Multi-
systemic Therapy.
137. Aos et al., supra note 128.
138. Barnoski, supra note 132. In one study, for example, youths in
Functional Family Therapy with incompetent therapists had higher recidivism
rates than controls, while recidivism declined by 20% for those with competent
therapists. Id.
139. Lipsey, Chapman & Landenberger, supra note 131. Multisystemic
therapy averages 60 hours of contact over a four-month period, and therapists
are always on call. OJJDP Model Programs Guide: Multisystemic Therapy,
supra note 133.
140. Aos et al., supra note 128.
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enlisted economists to calculate whether the benefits of various
programs, as measured by the value to taxpayers and crime victims
of the programs' expected effect on crime, are greater than their
costs. A comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of 400 programs
aimed at crime reduction found that several of the juvenile justice
programs we have described offered taxpayers the best return for
dollars invested-better than programs aimed at adult criminals
and better than early childhood and school prevention programs
(although the latter have other goals besides crime prevention).141
For example, based on research showing that MST reduces
recidivism by about 30%, taxpayers gain about $31,000 in
subsequent criminal justice system savings for each program
participant, or more than six dollars for each dollar spent. When
the value to potential crime victims is included, the benefit rises to
$131,918, or $28 for each dollar spent.142 The cost-benefit ratio for
Functional Family Therapy, Aggression Replacement Training,
and Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care were also very
favorable.14 3 The upshot is that a range of intensive programs in
the juvenile system have proved effective if they are faithfully and
competently implemented with appropriately targeted youths.
These programs offer good value for taxpayers' dollars spent, and
the benefits in terms of crime reduction far exceed the costs.
This promising research on juvenile justice programs
challenges the claim that punitive policies promote social welfare
by reducing youth crime. Cost-conscious policymakers who care
about reducing crime would be well advised to invest in these
research-based programs as a key element in the legal response to
juvenile crime. The fact that some of the most cost-effective
interventions are community-based programs suggests that
community sanctions can play an important role in a contemporary
regime that is quite different from that of probation and parole in
the traditional system. This not to say, however, that all young
offenders should remain in the community. Even though some
programs such as MST have been shown to reduce recidivism even
in serious and chronic offenders, there may be good reasons to
place in residential facilities some youths who commit serious
violent crimes or who are repeat offenders. Very few studies of
14 1. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. For FFT, the recidivism effect is somewhat less than for MST. The
average cost is $2,161; value to taxpayers is about $14,000 per participant, and
$59,000 per participant if benefit to victim is included. Thus the benefit per
dollar spent is $29. On the other hand, because "scared straight" programs
increase recidivism, taxpayers lose an average of $6,500 in increased costs for
each participant, and $24,500 if costs to crime victims are calculated.
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justice system programs to date have compared community-based
sanctions with incarceration, and thus the impact of incapacitation
periods on crime rates has rarely been included in the calculus.
Some youths simply present too much of a risk to public safety to
stay in the community. Moreover, the threat of incarceration may
have an impact on general deterrence that would be diluted in a
regime that seldom uses confinement as a sanction. However,
community sanctions are appropriate for many youths, and others
can benefit from community-based interventions as part of the
transition from residential programs. Extensive use of programs
that have demonstrated effectiveness is a good investment for a
state aiming to advance social welfare through its juvenile justice
policies.
The developmental and programmatic research we have
described provides a key rationale for maintaining a system of
juvenile justice separate from the adult system. The question of
whether maintaining a separate system for juveniles is important or
desirable has been the subject of policy debate in recent years, with
conservatives and even some progressive academics arguing for
dismantling the juvenile system. For example, Barry Feld has
argued for a unitary system in which juveniles would serve shorter
sentences for their crimes in recognition of their reduced
culpability. 1" Such an approach would satisfy the requirements of
fair punishment. But a key lesson of the research we have reviewed
is that a regime that aims to reduce crime will treat most juvenile
offenders differently from their adult counterparts; even youths
who must be incarcerated for public safety reasons should be
confined in facilities that provide a social context, programs, and
services very different from adult prisons. A separate juvenile
system is far more likely than a unitary system to create a
developmentally appropriate social environment, provide research-
based interventions, and generally to recognize that differential
treatment of adolescent offenders is the key to crime reduction.
To this point, we have examined youth crime policy through a
consequentialist lens, a perspective from which the primary policy
goal is to promote social welfare and prevent future crime. Many
supporters of punitive policies argue that achieving this goal
requires the extensive use of incarceration of young offenders in
both the adult and juvenile systems. We have found little support
for this claim. Indeed, most of the evidence points to the
conclusion that the social costs of criminalization outweigh the
benefits. Extensive use of incarceration is expensive; juvenile




justice expenditures have risen steeply in response to policy shifts
in this direction. This cost is justified only if these policies are
more effective at public protection than less costly alternatives. But
the existing research data provides little support for the notion that
tough sanctions function effectively to deter crime either generally
or in their impact on young offenders.
The evidence that adult punishment of young offenders is
likely to encourage antisocial behavior and undermine normative
development is reinforced by developmental knowledge about
adolescence. The scientific research supports that for most
adolescents, the inclination to get involved in criminal activity is a
product of developmental influences that will diminish with
maturity. Developmental research also emphasizes the importance
of social context during adolescence, and correctional programs
can either promote or inhibit healthy development depending on
the social context they provide. Treatment programs in the juvenile
system that apply the lessons of developmental research have been
shown to be cost-effective means of reducing recidivism. This
evidence suggests that rehabilitation, discredited as the foundation
of the traditional juvenile system, has a revitalized role to play in a
contemporary regime that aims to promote the welfare of society
as well as that of young offenders.
IV. RETRIBUTION AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE IN REGULATING
JUVENILE CRIME
We have shown that regulation grounded in scientific
knowledge of adolescence is more likely to prevent juvenile crime
and reduce its social cost than an approach that ignores differences
between juveniles and adults. In this Part, we argue that the
developmental model also promotes fairness and legitimacy in
juvenile justice policy. In a justice system committed to fairness,
punishment is limited to sanctions that are proportionate to the
harm of the offense and the culpability of the young offender.
Developmental knowledge clarifies that most youths, due to their
developmental immaturity, are less blameworthy than their adult
counterparts and thus should receive more lenient punishment.
Both crime reduction and fair punishment are important
purposes of crime regulation, and both are essential to a stable and
satisfactory system of youth crime regulation.145 Fairness alone is
an inadequate basis for formulating policy because, as we have
suggested, fairness can be accommodated within a unitary criminal
145. We developed this dual approach in SCorr & STEINBERG, supra note 2.
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justice system by giving youths discounted sentences.146 Only if
lawmakers also aim to reduce crime and promote social welfare is
it important to have a separate system that responds to the
developmental needs of young offenders. But crime prevention
alone is also inadequate as a regulatory purpose. Under the
developmental model, retribution functions importantly as a
limiting principle and source of legitimacy. Commitment to fair
retribution constrains the authority of the government to intervene
in the lives of young offenders as it pursues its preventive purposes
by mandating that the duration and harshness of sanctions be
limited to what the offender deserves on the basis of the offense
itself.147 This constraint is necessary to prevent excessive
punishment and to avoid exacerbating sentencing disparities that
already threaten the legitimacy and political stability of the justice
system. It also promotes confidence in the legal system as well as
public acceptance of criminal sanctions.14 8
This Part begins with a brief analysis of the culpability of
adolescent offenders, which confirms that developmental factors
influence youthful criminal choices in ways that mitigate blame
under conventional criminal law principles and doctrines. We then
argue that retribution, as embodied in the proportionality principle
is an essential element in a satisfactory model of juvenile justice,
challenging the argument for a regime based on prevention alone.
Finally this Part addresses the question of whether policies that
promote social welfare will be compatible with proportionality and
generally with principles of fair punishment. We conclude that
tensions exist between prevention and retribution but can usually
be reconciled.
A. Developmental Research and the Culpability of Young Offenders
In general, factors that reduce culpability under the criminal
law can be grouped in three rough categories. The first category
includes endogenous impairments and deficiencies in the actor's
decision-making capacity that affect his choice to get involved in
criminal activity. Mental illness and retardation are in this
category, as is developmental immaturity. Under the second
146. FELD, supra note 5; ScoTr & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 147.
147. See supra note 52 (discussing criminal law scholars who have argued
that retribution should function as a limiting principle both to constrain state
authority and to promote public acceptance of criminal sanctions); see also
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment, 70 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2003).
148. H.L.A. Hart argued that retribution should be retained for this purpose.
HART, supra note 52, at 180-83.
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category, an actor may be less culpable if he engaged in the
criminal conduct in response to extraordinary coercive
circumstances that a reasonable person would be unable to resist.
The third category of mitigation applies when the actor can show
that the criminal act was not the product of bad character. Each of
these sources of mitigation applies to the crimes of juvenile
offenders, and together they support a regime that deals with most
juveniles as an intermediate category of offenders-not as adults,
but also not as children.149
1. Deficiencies in Decision-Making
Developmental research indicates that adolescents differ from
adults in their decision-making capacities in ways that affect their
criminal choices due to both cognitive and psychosocial
immaturity, but the deficiencies are more subtle than those that
characterize younger children. By age 14 or 15, most adolescents
have the capacities for reasoning and understanding comparable to
those of adults when measured in laboratory studies. 5 0 But there is
reason to believe that in unstructured real-world settings, such as
those in which decisions about criminal activity are made,
teenagers do not process information as efficiently as adults and
may be more susceptible to stress and emotional arousal. 5 1
More importantly, perhaps, several psychosocial developmental
factors influence adolescents' decision-making in ways that
contribute to immature judgment. First, teenagers are more
susceptible to peer influence than are adults.' 52 They also differ
149. This section summarizes earlier work arguing that mitigation should be
applied to the criminal conduct of young offenders. See ScoTT & STEINBERG,
supra note 2; see also Scott & Steinberg, supra note 67.
150. Daniel P. Keating, Cognitive and Brain Development, in HANDBOOK OF
ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 45 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds.,
2d ed. 2004).
151. See Shawn L. Ward & Willis F. Overton, Semantic Familiarity,
Relevance, and the Development of Deductive Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 488 (1990). Adolescent decision-making under stress is often poorer
than in hypothetical situations, and research suggests that the effects of stress on
decision-making are more marked for adolescents than for adults. Leon Mann,
Stress, Affect, and Risk-Taking, in RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOR 201, 214 (J. Frank
Yates ed., 1992).
152. Susceptibility to peer pressure declines throughout the high school
years. See Elizabeth S. Scott, N. Dickon Reppucci & Jennifer L. Woolard,
Evaluating Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 221, 229-30 (1995); Laurence Steinberg & Kathryn C. Monahan, Age
Differences in Resistance to Peer Influence, 43 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL.
1531 (2007); Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of
Autonomy in Early Adolescence, 57 CHILD DEV. 841 (1986).
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from adults in future orientation, being less inclined to weigh
future consequences and more likely to focus on the here and
now.153 Third, adolescents differ in their assessment of and attitude
toward risk. Teens tend to value rewards more than risks and
sometimes count as a reward what an adult would view as a risk.154
And fourth, teenagers tend to be more impulsive than adults,
having more difficulty regulating their moods, impulses, and
behavior. 155
In combination, these developmental factors are likely to
influence juveniles' decisions to get involved in criminal activity
in ways that distinguish them from adult criminals and make their
choices less culpable. Adolescent decision-making is not as
impaired as is that of children or persons with severe mental
disabilities, whose crimes may be excused due to their
impairments. But the deficiencies that contribute to immature
judgment in teens are developmental in nature and are
characteristic of adolescents as a group. They are also organic and
no more subject to individual control than are the impairments that
affect the decision-making of mentally ill and retarded adults.
153. A.L. Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence: The Present of
Things Future Revisited, 15 J. YouTH & ADOLESCENCE 15, 99 (1986); Jari-Erik
Nurmi, How Do Adolescents See Their Future? A Review of the Development of
Future Orientation and Planning, 11 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. I (1991); Laurence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting,
80 CHILD DEV. 28 (2009).
154. Elizabeth Cauffman et al., Age Differences in Affective Decision-making
as Indexed by Performance on the Iowa Gambling Task, 46 DEVELOPMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 193 (2010); Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on
Risk Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and
Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625 (2005);
Susan G. Millstein & Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher, Perceptions of Risk and
Vulnerability, 31 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 10 (2002); Laurence Steinberg, A Social
Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV.
78 (2008); Laurence Steinberg, Risk-Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and
Why?, 1021 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 51 (2004).
155. Ellen Greenberger, Education and the Acquisition of Psychosocial
Maturity, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MATURITY 155 (David McClelland
ed., 1982); Reed Larson, Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi & Ronald Graef, Mood
Variability and the Psychosocial Adjustment of Adolescents, 9 J. YOUTH &
ADOLESCENCE 469 (1980); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Diferences in
Sensation Seeking and Impulsivity as Indexed by Behavior and Self-Report:
Evidence for a Dual Systems Model, 44 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1764
(2010).
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2. Unformed Character and Culpability
A related mitigation condition that is also important in
assessing the culpability of typical young offenders involves the
relatively unformed nature of their characters. The criminal law
implicitly assumes that harmful conduct reflects the actor's bad
character, and evidence that this is not so can be offered in
mitigation of culpability.' 5 6 The criminal conduct of most teens is
grounded in developmental processes that are constitutive of
adolescence-immature judgment and normative experimentation
with risky behaviors. It does not stem from stable moral
deficiencies associated with bad character. The character of the
typical adolescent has not yet stabilized, and his personal identity
is in flux; 5 7 precisely for this reason, his criminal act, like that of
the adult who establishes mitigation on this ground, does not
express his bad character.
3. Situational Coercion
A somewhat different source of mitigation in criminal law may
apply to some adolescents who, because of their social context, are
subject to extraordinary coercive pressures to become involved in
criminal activity. The criminal law does not require unusual
fortitude or bravery, and mitigation may apply to crimes
committed in response to extreme external pressures that an
ordinary (or "reasonable") person would not be able to resist. 5 8
Ordinary adolescents who live in high-crime neighborhoods are
subject to intense social pressures and often tangible threats that
156. The provocation defense has been explained in these terms. Thus,
sufficient provocation is evidence that the killing was not the product of bad
character, warranting a reduction of the crime from murder to manslaughter.
Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law ofHomicide II, 37
COLUM. L. REv. 1261, 1281 (1937) ("[T]he greater the provocation, measured in
that way, the more ground there is for attributing the intensity of the actor's
passions and his lack of self-control . . . to the extraordinary character of the
situation ... rather than to any extraordinary deficiency in his own character.").
Also, a defendant can introduce evidence of his previously established good
character in mitigation at sentencing.
157. Identity formation takes place in two stages: individuation in early
adolescence, and identity development in late adolescence and early adulthood.
See W. Andrew Collins & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development in
Interpersonal Context, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 1003 (Nancy
Eisenberg, William Damon & Richard M. Lerner eds., 6th ed. 2006).
158. The defenses of duress and necessity involve extreme exogenous
circumstances. Circumstances not extreme enough to excuse the defendant from
responsibility may be introduced in mitigation at sentencing.
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induce them to join in criminal activity. In some contexts, coercion
is so intense that only unusual teens resist the pressure. Moreover,
unlike adults, adolescents are minors whose liberties are
constricted due to their dependency; thus, they are not in a position
to extricate themselves from their neighborhoods, schools, or
homes.
These circumstances are similar in kind to those that are
involved in claims of duress, provocation, necessity, or domination
by co-defendants. The source of mitigation on the basis of
exogenous conditions is not purely developmental in nature, but it
is a product of dependency, which itself is grounded in immaturity.
When adolescents cross the line into legal adulthood, the formal
legal disabilities of youth are lifted. Young adults can avoid the
situational pressures they face by removing themselves from
criminogenic settings. Moreover, pressure to get involved in crime
eases as normal maturation influences most individuals to move
beyond the risky activities of youth. Thus, adults have no claim of
situational mitigation on the ground that they are restricted to a
social setting in which avoiding crime is difficult.159
The adolescent who commits a crime typically is not so
deficient in her decision-making capacity that she cannot
understand the harmful consequences of her conduct or appreciate
its wrongfulness, as might be true of a mentally disordered person
or a child. Nor are the circumstances of her social context as
coercive as those that excuse defendants from criminal liability.160
159. The inability to escape distinguishes adolescents from adult offenders,
who might argue that they are less culpable than other criminal actors because of
their "rotten social background." Some commentators have argued that such a
defense be recognized and available to adult lawbreakers who grew up in crime-
inducing settings without inculcation in pro-social norms or opportunities to
succeed in socially acceptable ways, on the ground that these social forces
combine to constrain their freedom to avoid crime. Richard Delgado, "Rotten
Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 63-65 & n.363 (1985). This
defense generally has been rejected by lawmakers (rightly, we think), in part
because of the high social cost incurred if a defense were available to a large
open-ended category of adult offenders otherwise indistinguishable from the
norm. More importantly, perhaps, the defense threatens to dissolve the important
but delicate line between free will and determinism, the boundary of criminal
responsibility. Stephen J. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply
to Judge Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1251-53 (1976). In contrast,
recognition of social context as situational mitigation that is limited to juveniles
as a class does not carry the same threat of unraveling the core of criminal
responsibility.
160. Under the duress doctrine, the defendant must show that he faced an
immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm from which he could not
reasonably escape. See BONNIE ET AL., supra note 49, at 488-89.
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But the developmental and social factors that drive adolescent
decision-making predictably contribute to choices that reflect
immature judgment and unformed character and are made under
social pressure. Thus youthful criminal conduct has much in
common with that of adults whose criminal acts are out of
character, whose decision-making capacities are impaired by
emotional distress or mental illness or disability, or whose choices
are influenced by extremely coercive circumstances. As the
Supreme Court recognized in striking down the juvenile death
penalty in Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the criminal choices of
adolescents deserve less punishment than do those of adults
because they are shaped by developmental immaturity and
coercive social contexts.' 6 1 A justice system that is committed to
fairness, as embodied in the principle of proportionality, will
punish adolescents less severely than adult offenders.
B. Why Retribution is Important
At one level, the conclusion that mitigation applies to the
crimes of young offenders has modest implications for justice
policy. As we have indicated, a regime dedicated to fairness could
deal with juvenile and adult offenders in a unitary system and
simply apply a "youth discount" to the sentences of juvenile
offenders in recognition of their reduced culpability. 62 The
argument for a separate juvenile justice system that implements
developmentally-based policies aimed at reducing crime is not
based on fairness and is unconcerned with the proportionality of
sanctions. Therefore, given our emphasis on the social welfare
value of evidence-based policies aimed at prevention, why is
retribution or fair punishment important to the construction of
optimal juvenile justice policies?
Before we explain the essential role of proportionality in a
well-functioning model of juvenile justice, we should review
briefly the difference between the law's preventive and retributive
purposes. Retribution focuses on the past criminal act, which
determines the amount of deserved punishment. The goal of crime
prevention, in contrast, is future-oriented. Deterrence (specific and
general), rehabilitation, and incapacitation all focus on the impact
161. Justice Kennedy, drawing on our previously published work, described
three features of adolescence that distinguish adolescents from their adult
counterparts-diminished decision-making ability, vulnerability to external
coercion from which adolescents cannot escape, and the unformed nature of
adolescent identity. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 567-70 (2005).
162. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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of correctional interventions on future criminal conduct, and they
are not concerned with calibrating that response to the seriousness
of the past criminal act or the culpability of the offender.' 63 Thus,
an offender who is judged to present a serious risk of reoffending
may receive a longer sentence than another whose crime is more
serious but who is deemed less dangerous. Thus, taking
proportionality seriously means not only that juveniles, due to their
immaturity, will be punished more leniently than their adult
counterparts, but it also means that young offenders who commit
similar crimes should receive sanctions of similar duration on the
basis of their crimes and culpability. Proportionality prohibits
serious disparities in the treatment of young offenders on the basis
of factors other than their criminal conduct.
Over the past century, retribution has been in and out of favor
among lawmakers, reformers, and scholars. The Progressive
reformers who created the traditional juvenile court insisted that its
purpose was solely to rehabilitate young offenders and that
criminal responsibility and punishment played no role in
delinquency dispositions.'6 For this reason, juvenile court
dispositions were indeterminate-based on the individual
offender's treatment needs-and, in theory, unrelated to the
seriousness of the offense. In the 1970s and 1980s, reformers on
both the left and right rejected the rehabilitative model as both
ineffective and unfair. Youth advocates favored proportionate
sentences in the juvenile system that were shorter in duration than
those imposed on adult criminals.' 6 5 This approach emphasized
accountability and fairness and rejected crime prevention as a
dispositional goal.166 More recently, alarm about public safety has
resulted in a shift in emphasis toward prevention, particularly
incapacitation, although punitive reformers also emphasized full
163. See generally BONNIE ET AL., supra note 49, at 23-33.
164. BEN B. LINDSEY & HARVEY J. O'HIGGINS, THE BEAST 144, 149 (Univ.
of Wash. Press 1970) (1909).
165. FRANCIS ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN
CRIMINOLOGY (1964); Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv.7; Monrad G.
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957).
166. The American Bar Association's Institute for Judicial Administration
sponsored an ambitious law reform project called the Juvenile Justice Standards,
which embodied this proportionate sentencing approach. Volumes included
Transfer Between Courts, Adjudication, Dispositions, Delinquency, and
Sanctions, among others. INST. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, AM. BAR Ass'N,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS (1980); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME: TWENTIETH-CENTURY FUND TASKFORCE ON
SENTENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS (1978).
2010] 87
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
accountability.167 Recently, juvenile advocates also have focused
on crime reduction in advocating for evidence-based community
programs for young offenders. Professors Slobogin and Fondacaro
have highlighted the importance of these programs in arguing for a
regime dedicated solely to reducing crime and protecting the
public.168
Slobogin and Fondacaro reject retribution altogether as a
legitimate purpose of juvenile justice policy; under their model,
proportionality plays no role in determining correctional
dispositions. Instead, their regime aims solely at specific
deterrence; dispositions are determined on the basis of risk
assessment which they assert can be performed with substantial
accuracy.16§ Slobogin and Fondacaro argue that evidence-based
community programs are the most effective means of reducing
juvenile crime and suggest that most delinquency dispositions will
take this form.17 0 But they concede that some youths who pose a
risk to public safety must be incarcerated and implicitly accept
that, under their approach, incarceration might extend for the
duration of juvenile court jurisdiction for youths deemed too
dangerous to be in the community.17 ' In their view, the judgment
about the need for incarceration and its duration should be
independent of the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of
the offender. 172 Thus, in theory, a youth could be picked up for
shoplifting and, based on a risk assessment, confined for many
years.173 In short, not only are sanctions not reduced for juveniles
on the basis of immaturity, but dispositional duration for less
serious crimes is not limited by what would be proportionate
punishment for adults.174
167. The mantra "adult time for adult crime" suggests a focus on full
responsibility for juveniles, based on the seriousness of the offense.
168. Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 3, at 1, 13, 31.
169. Id. at 25-26.
170. Id. at 16.
171. Id. Slobogin and Fondacaro assert, optimistically we think, that only
youths who pose an imminent risk of serious harm would be confined under
their model. Confinement is subject to frequent review for continuing risk,
terminating of necessity at the age that juvenile court jurisdiction ends.
172. The authors require a crime as a predicate for intervention, on the basis
of the legality principle; thereafter, the nature and duration of intervention are
based on risk assessment. Id. at 53.
173. This possibility is less apocryphal than it seems, as very young
offenders are more likely to persist in criminal activity than older teens. See
Scorr & STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 252-57; see also infra note 178.
174. For serious crimes, the proportionate adult sentence would likely extend
beyond the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, which is the durational limit under
Slobogin and Fondacaro's model. Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 3, at 7.
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There is much to admire in this provocative reform proposal.
Slobogin and Fondocaro employ social science research in a
sophisticated way, emphasizing the merits of evidence-based
programs and locating these programs at the core of their regime.
Moreover, they reject the transfer of youths to adult court,"
although it is unclear how this could be avoided for youths who
threaten public safety in ways that cannot be dealt with in the
juvenile system. But, although their aims are benign, the policy
model offered by these scholars is defective in ways that are not so
different from the flaws that led to the collapse of the traditional
rehabilitative model. Open ended indeterminacy, whether based on
risk assessment or diagnosis, is unsatisfactory because it poses a
substantial risk of unfairness that inevitably threatens the
legitimacy of any regime aimed solely at prevention.
Under a pure prevention model, the youth's criminal act
functions as a threshold condition for state intervention' 76 but does
not otherwise determine the form or duration of the correctional
disposition. Although the crime itself provides important
information in the risk assessment, many other factors unrelated to
culpability and outside the control of the youth may also be
relevant. An accurate risk assessment may conclude that one youth
is a more promising candidate for a community-based program
than another whose crime was identical because the former has
more competent or invested parents, lives in a lower-crime
neighborhood, has fewer learning deficits, is involved in a sport
with a caring coach, or has no antisocial siblings. Such factors
(particularly parental capacities) may indeed be predictive of the
success or failure of evidence-based programs, but to base the
decision of whether the youth should stay in the community or be
confined in a correctional facility on considerations completely
unrelated to the underlying crime is problematic on fairness
grounds.
The fairness problem is magnified by the likelihood that factors
influencing risk assessment are linked to race, socioeconomic
status, and age. Thus, minority youths, youths from single-parent
homes, or youths who live in poverty may be less likely to have
supportive families or other resources or attributes that are
associated with a lower risk of reoffending or with positive
program outcomes.' 7 7 If so, under a pure prevention regime, they
175. Id. at 14.
176. See supra note 172.
177. Slobogin and Fondacaro recognize that delinquency is linked to living
in poor high-crime neighborhoods and that schools and families are important
contextual factors affecting criminal behavior. Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra
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may be less likely than their more fortunate peers to qualify for
community programs and more likely to be incarcerated.
Moreover, substantial evidence indicates that youths who are
arrested at a very young age are at significantly higher risk of
persisting in criminal activity than those who first become
involved in crime in mid-adolescence.' 7 8 Under a pure prevention
regime, a ten year old arrested for theft who has a history of
family, behavioral, and academic problems might be a candidate
for correctional interventions that extend for as long as he is under
juvenile court jurisdiction-in many states, into his twenties. Thus,
the least culpable juveniles under conventional criminal law
principles would be subject to the most intensive interventions in
response to their crimes. Although proponents may insist that these
discrepancies are acceptable because the dispositional purpose is
not punishment but crime reduction, this will likely offer little
comfort to youths subject to more restrictive treatment than their
peers.
To this point, we have focused on dispositional disparities that
are likely to result from accurate and unbiased risk assessment. But
risk assessment is far from an exact science and will always rely on
the subjective judgments of justice system decision-makers.179 The
possibility that they may exaggerate the risk of reoffending by
youths who belong to racial and ethnic minority groups is
substantial. Much has been written about racial and ethnic bias in
the justice system; disproportionate minority contact and
confinement are broadly recognized as a serious threat to the
note 3, at 21-23. Thus, risk reduction may pose more of a challenge for youths
in lower socioeconomic neighborhoods (who often will belong to racial and
ethnic minorities) who have weak family support and go to inferior schools, and
they are likely to warrant more intensive interventions ex ante under a pure
prevention approach than middle class youths. The effectiveness of many
programs such as Functional Family Therapy and MST depends on parental
engagement.
178. Age of first arrest is a key prognostic indicator of reoffending; the small
number of youths who are arrested before age 12 are far more likely to become
career criminals than those whose first arrest is in mid-adolescence-
particularly very young offenders who have a history of problem behaviors
beginning early in childhood. Terrie Moffitt describes this group as "life-course-
persistent offenders." Moffitt, supra note 12. Under a pure prevention model,
risk reduction interventions for these offenders are likely to be intensive and of
extended duration.
179. Edward P. Mulvey & Anne-Marie R. Iselin, Improving Professional
Judgments ofRisk and Amenability in Juvenile Justice, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2008,
at 35, available at http://futureofcbildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
18_02_03.pdf.
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legitimacy of the system.s Honest judges, probation officers, and
other agents may engage in unconscious racial and ethnic
stereotyping in assessing the risk of offending by minority youths,
with the result that these juveniles may be subject to more
restrictive sanctions than accurate risk assessment would dictate.' '
Some research evidence indicates that a higher percentage of
minority youths are transferred by judges than would be subject to
adult court jurisdiction on the basis of the crime alone.182 A regime
that bases dispositions solely on risk prediction may well result in
greater disparities in the treatment of white and minority youths.
This problem can be substantially mitigated by incorporating
retribution as a limiting principle in juvenile crime regulation.
Some scholars have embraced retribution, not as the sole (or even
primary) purpose of state intervention in responding to criminal
conduct, but as an important check or side constraint on the power
of the government to deprive individuals of liberty.183 Some
criminal law theorists endorse strong retributivism, under which
sentences must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense
and the culpability of the offender-no more, no less. 184 Under a
weaker retributivist approach, proportionality is important in
limiting the maximum severity and duration of criminal sentences
and in grading offenses on the basis of harm. In our view, the latter
approach is compatible with a model of juvenile crime regulation
that incorporates retribution as a limiting principle, but only if it
avoids excessive disparities among similarly situated young
offenders. Thus, under the developmental model, dispositions may
vary somewhat on the basis of preventive factors, but the range
should be limited to avoid unfairness.
180. Differences in arrest rates, processing, and incarceration between
minority youths and others is well established. See generally OUR CHILDREN,
THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberley Kempf-
Leonard eds., 2005) (examining racial disparities in the processing and
punishment ofjuveniles).
181. George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official
Assessments of Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating
Mechanisms, 63 AM. Soc. REV. 554 (1998); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery,
Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004).
182. See Barnoski, supra note 29.
183. See supra notes 52, 147.
184. Michael Moore is in this group. He argues that it is respectful of the
moral worth of the criminal actor to hold him to the same standard that we
would apply to ourselves. Michael Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in




This dual approach is superior to a pure prevention model in
several ways. First, it acknowledges that a part of society's purpose
in sanctioning criminals is punishment-holding youths
accountable for the harms they cause. Accountability is important
to public acceptance of any regime of crime regulation. 8 The
traditional model of juvenile justice collapsed in part because
proponents insisted that the only purpose of intervention was
rehabilitation, a claim that ultimately had little public support.
Second, young offenders themselves are likely to benefit from
crime regulation that emphasizes accountability. An important
developmental lesson of adolescence is learning to accept personal
responsibility for one's choices; this lesson is particularly
important when choices cause harm to others.1 8 6 This lesson is lost
under the pure prevention approach, which obscures the
connection between the disposition and the underlying crime.
Moreover, there is evidence that offenders are more likely to
comply with court-ordered sanctions and less likely to reoffend
when they believe that they have been subject to fair proceedings.
Thus, a regime that permitted excessive sanctioning in the service
of prevention has the potential to undermine some juveniles' sense
185. H.L.A. Hart argued that the criminal law should incorporate retribution
because the norm of imposing responsibility for causing harm is well established
and accepted in our society. "The law should . . . reflect in its judgments on
human conduct distinctions that not only underly morality, but pervade the
whole of our social life." HART, supra note 52, at 180-83; see also Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453
(1997) (arguing that a utilitarian system of criminal justice should be based on
principles of desert, as these define and reinforce norms against offending and
promote compliance).
186. As individuals mature into and through adolescence, their conceptions
of morality change. At around age 13, there is a normative shift in moral
reasoning from an orientation in which individualism and instrumentalism
predominate to one in which moral behavior involves
living up to what is expected by people close to you or what others
generally expect of individuals in your role .... Being good" is ...
reflected in having good motives, showing concern for others, and in
maintaining mutual relationships through trust, loyalty, respect, and
gratitude. At this stage, the focus in moral reasoning shifts from self-
interest . . . to fulfilling others' expectations and concern with one's
position in others' eyes, as well as maintaining positive interpersonal
relationships with others.
Nancy Eisenberg & Amanda Sheffield Morris, Moral Cognitions and Prosocial
Responding in Adolescence, in HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOGY 155,
157 (Richard M. Lerner & Laurence Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2004) (citation
omitted).
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of "procedural justice," thereby elevating the risk of future
criminal behavior. 8 7
Third, in a regime that is grounded in retribution as well as
prevention, dispositions will be predictable and transparently based
on the youth's criminal conduct. Within a limited range, youths
who commit similar crimes will receive sanctions of similar
duration, and none will be subject to dispositions that exceed what
is fairly deserved on the basis of the youth's culpability and the
seriousness of the offense. This is important as a matter of
individual justice, but as we have suggested, it is also important as
a means of avoiding disparate treatment of offenders on the basis
of race and ethnicity. The indeterminacy of dispositions in the
traditional juvenile court became a target of criticism not only from
conservatives, who thought the system was too lenient, but also
from youth advocates, who objected to the lack of fair procedures
and to sentencing disparities and excessive sanctions justified by
the avowed rehabilitative purpose. Under a regime that insists
that its purpose is not punishment but crime prevention, the
government is free to deprive offenders of liberty for as long as is
needed to protect public safety. This will vary widely among
offenders; for some it may result in no intervention, although for
others the deprivation of liberty may be far greater than is
warranted on the basis of their criminal conduct.189 This problem is
reduced through the adoption of retribution as a limiting principle.
Under our developmental model of juvenile justice, the
reduced culpability of most young offenders will be recognized
through correctional interventions that are shorter in duration than
those of similarly situated adult offenders. Within the duration that
is deserved on the basis of the offense and the young offenders'
culpability, the disposition can and should aim to promote social
welfare by rehabilitating the youth, if necessary, and enhancing his
prospects for non-criminal adulthood. Thus, sanctions of
determinate duration should be carried out in settings that promote
187. Alex R. Piquero et al., Developmental Trajectories of Legal
Socialization Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 267 (2005).
188. See supra note 165 (citing criticisms of traditional court as harmful to
youths). In In re Gault, the landmark opinion holding that youths in delinquency
proceedings have a right to counsel and to other procedural protections, the
defendant was adjudicated delinquent and sent to a secure facility for up to six
years for a minor misdemeanor. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
189. Slobogin and Fondacaro point with approval to Kansas v. Hendricks, which
upheld a law authorizing confinement of sex offenders for treatment after their
sentences are completed for so long as they pose a threat of future sex offending. 521
U.S. 346 (1997); see Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 3, at 41-44.
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healthy development and reduce the likelihood of future
offending-in the community, if possible, or in a residential
facility if necessary.
C. Are Retribution and Prevention Compatible?
The aims of fair punishment and promotion of social welfare
through crime prevention are very different and sometimes will be
in tension with one another. Can both purposes actually be
accommodated in a model of juvenile justice grounded in
developmental knowledge? In most cases, we think the answer is
"yes." Presumptively, as we explained above, the duration of
sanctions is based on the harm of the act and the immaturity of the
youth, and the content-what happens to the youth during the
period that he is in state custody-is determined by the crime
prevention goals we have described. Put differently, retribution as
a limiting principle simply restricts the amount of time allowed for
the state to undertake its crime reduction efforts, as well as the
harshness of the intervention. Proportionality does not require
precisely measured punishment; as we have suggested, it is
compatible with a regime that authorizes a limited range of
sanctions for a given offense.
Occasionally tension can arise between the developmental
model's two goals. For example, a youth may commit a very
serious crime that warrants incarceration in a residential facility on
proportionality grounds, but a community program is less costly
and, in his case, may be more likely to minimize the likelihood of
recidivism and promote his healthy development. In another case,
removal of the youth from his family and neighborhood for an
extended period may offer the best hope of avoiding continued
involvement in criminal activity, but represents a more severe
sanction than is appropriate for his crime. Moreover, as we
suggested above, public safety considerations may warrant the
secure placement of some individuals convicted of a particular
serious crime-but not others. Should high-risk and low-risk
youths receive the same sentences for their similar crimes? The
pure prevention approach avoids these clashes between prevention
and retribution by simply excluding retribution and proportionality
as considerations.
Perhaps the most pronounced tension between preventive and
retributive purposes arises in cases involving very young
offenders-aged 12 and under-who have a history of behavioral
problems. Based on their immaturity, these youths are the least
culpable of juvenile offenders; thus, fairness dictates that they
should receive the most lenient interventions. But their prognosis
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for reoffending is far bleaker than is that of older first offenders.1 90
Thus, under a regime that cares about prevention, they should
receive intensive interventions; indeed, without such interventions,
they are very likely to offend again. Reconciling retribution and
prevention with this category of young offenders may be difficult,
but we are not comfortable with grossly disproportionate
dispositions based on risk assessment. In our view, the tension can
be ameliorated by combining proportionate correctional
dispositions with social, educational, and psycholojical services
that are available to children not in the justice system. 91
These hard questions are not unique to the juvenile system;
they also arise in criminal sentencing.192 In that context, courts
struggle to impose fair punishment while attending to crime
prevention concerns. Many (although not all) retributivists would
agree that excessive punishment (more than is deserved on the
basis of the offender's harm and culpability) is a greater affront to
fairness than insufficient punishment.193 On this view, punishing a
youth less harshly than he deserves as a means of reducing the
social cost of his crime may be more acceptable than imposing a
harsher sentence than he deserves in the interest of reducing the
likelihood that he will become involved in criminal activity in the
future. However, as we have emphasized, an important element of
fairness is that similar cases be treated similarly; thus, we are not
sanguine about a regime in which one armed robber is sent to a
correctional institution (the deserved punishment), while another
receives a community sanction based on judicial judgments about
their relative risk and potential for rehabilitation. This is
particularly worrisome to the extent that racial and ethnic biases
play a role in sentencing. These concerns lead us to conclude that a
presumption favoring proportionate punishment is justified, and
that in hard cases, fairness should trump social welfare.
We recognize that policymakers may reach a different
conclusion-and that these are difficult choices. Fortunately, cases
190. See supra note 173.
191. The state has the power to intervene to promote the welfare of children
whose parents cannot provide adequate care and guidance. Thus, special
educational services, counseling, and family support services, including foster
care, can be provided to these youths and their families. See ScoTr &
STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 250-60.
192. Criminal law casebooks pose this classic dilemma by presenting
students with several cases in which actors commit the same crime with
different levels of culpability. See, e.g., BONNIE ET. AL., supra note 45, at 3-6
(hypothesizing several cases involving the death of a child left in a car).
193. Michael Moore favors imposing proportionate punishment and opposes
leniency. Moore, supra note 184.
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involving normative adolescent offenders that truly present a
conflict between fairness and social welfare are likely to be
infrequent. In general, the research evidence supports the greater
use of community sanctions in dispositions for juveniles than for
adults, not only on grounds of social welfare but also on grounds
of proportionality. Modest sentence variations based on social
welfare concerns acknowledge the multiple goals that must be
accommodated in a satisfactory and stable system and do not
undermine fairness excessively. A regime that is committed to the
recognition of adolescents as a distinct category, and to the
presumptively more lenient punishment of juveniles than adults,
embodies the principle of proportionality far better than the
contemporary regime in which many youths are punished as adults.
The interests of justice will be served generally by reforms that
reinforce and maintain a sturdier boundary between the juvenile
and adult systems, as long as sanctions are roughly calibrated on
the basis of harm and culpability.
CONCLUSION
Crime prevention and fair punishment are the two important
purposes of the government's response to criminal conduct. We
have argued that a satisfactory system for regulating juvenile crime
must satisfy both purposes. Scientific knowledge about adolescent
development provides the basis for an approach to legal regulation
that promotes social welfare by reducing crime at a reasonable cost
and that also is fair to young offenders in recognizing that they are
less culpable than their adult counterparts.
Our analysis challenges the assumption underlying the recent
punitive reforms that the public interest is best served by a
response to juvenile crime that emphasizes incarceration and deals
with many young offenders as adults. To the contrary, policies that
recognize that correctional settings are social contexts that can
inhibit or facilitate healthy adolescent development in most young
offenders are likely to be more effective at reducing the social cost
of juvenile crime. Substantial evidence supports that research-
based correctional programs in the juvenile system are likely to
reduce recidivism and facilitate the transition to normative
adulthood more effectively than incarceration, and at lower
financial cost to society.
But a justice regime that promotes social welfare will not be
adequate unless it also incorporates principles of fair punishment.
Our analysis demonstrates that fairness will be served if juvenile
sanctions are proportionate, based on the reduced blameworthiness
of the young offender and the seriousness of the offense
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committed. Retribution functions as a critically important limiting
principle, serving both to protect young offenders from excessive
punishment and to ensure that like cases are treated similarly. This
parity guards against dispositional decisions that may disadvantage
minority and low income youths due to bias or even accurate risk
assessment. Ultimately, the legitimacy of juvenile crime policy
depends on public perception that society is subjecting all young
offenders to fair punishment.

